Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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ger. So much for his implied threats of a
tary superiority, coupled with the fact that
potential "radical implosion" of Pakistan.
India could survive a nuclear first strike
After failing in that rearguard effort to pre-
(Pakistan might not survive such an attack)
serve Pakistan's dominant influence in
would permit them to fight a limited war
Afghanistan and prevent the elimination of
with Pakistan while deterring that country
from launching a nuclear attack on India.57 It
Islamabad's Taliban ally, the Pakistanis next
turned to securing their interests vis--vis
was that demonstration of India's military
India. Even if one doesn't accept Indian allega-
might, aimed at deterring Pakistan from
tions that some of the al-Qaeda fighters evac-
launching a nuclear strike while India
uated from Afghanistan by the Pakistanis
exploited its conventional advantage, not
were infiltrated into Kashmir, or that
Musharraf's sudden conversion to an
Pakistani agents assisted the December 13
Ataturk-like reformist agenda, that persuad-
attack on the Indian parliament, there is no
ed Pakistan's military dictator to pledge that
doubt that a lack of response by India to the
his country would not be used as a base for
continued terrorism in Kashmir and the
terrorism and to announce a broad ban on
attack in New Delhi would have been per-
militant groups accused of fomenting vio-
lence in Indian-held Kashmir.58 India's hard-
ceived as a major blow to Indian national secu-
By threatening a
rity interests and as a victory for Pakistan. It
line position may have also persuaded the
nuclear escala-
certainly would have created the impression
Bush administration to toughen its position
that U.S. diplomatic pressure, driven by con-
on Pakistan-based terrorist groups, includ-
tion, Islamabad
siderations of Pakistani concerns, had made it
ing those operating against Indian rule in
was pressing
Kashmir.59
impossible for the Indians to react to a terror-
Washington to
ist attack in New Delhi in the same way that
The Dispute with India and Pakistan's
the United States responded to similar attacks
veto possible
Decline
in New York and Washington. In short, by
Indian military
threatening a nuclear escalation, Islamabad
The outcome of the Indian-Pakistani
was pressing Washington to veto possible
standoff, highlighting Islamabad's precari-
action against
Indian military action against Pakistan.
ous position, was the last stage in a process
Pakistan.
that had been accelerating since September
11, during which time Pakistan had seen its
Pakistan: A Diminished
strategic position badly erode. Also, with the
Client State
Taliban gone, Pakistan has lost a key surro-
gate in its covert support for Islamic funda-
But India's powerful reaction to the terror-
mentalist guerrillas in Kashmir. These devel-
ist attack in New Delhi, including moving its
opments took place against the backdrop of
aircraft and nuclear-capable short-range bal-
a major U.S. assault against the jihad-inter-
listic missiles toward its border with Pakistan,
national terrorism network, which included
shifting infantry divisions from the border
many groups with close ties to Pakistan and
with China to the western frontier with
its financial benefactor, Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan, and activating more than 1,000
More generally, the counterterrorism
tanks and armored vehicles, sent a clear mes-
offensive against radical Islamic terrorist
sage to the world. India was promising, not
groups and the growing hostility toward mil-
bluffing, and calling Pakistan's bluff on its
itant Islam in the United States and the West,
assumption that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal
coupled with growing cooperation between
acts as a strategic "equalizer" that ensured that
three leading foes of Pakistan--India, Israel,
Islamabad's support for terrorism against
and Turkey--have been major strategic blows
India would not escalate into an all-out war.56
to Pakistan. Add to that the political instabil-
But India's military strategists are confi-
ity and the economic and social problems
dent that their country's conventional mili-
that continue to beset Pakistan, and that
16