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Islamabad advo-

"cells" in the military were out of control and

Ramadan and devise restrictive war aims in

acting like "rogue" institutions).48

Afghanistan based on Pakistan's insistence

cated only weak-

Moreover, the nuclear scenario seemed to

on not eliminating the Taliban presence.

ening the regime

be an outgrowth of the new Pakistani nuclear

Islamabad advocated only weakening the

and destroying

doctrine toward India that was adopted by

regime and destroying al-Qaeda while leaving

Pakistan's military-political leadership and

in place "moderate" Taliban forces, consist-

al-Qaeda while

based on pressuring Washington to tilt the

ing of "defectors" from the movement, that

leaving in place

regional balance of power back in favor of

would play a role in a new postwar govern-

ment in Kabul.52 It seemed as though U.S.

Pakistan. The Pakistanis needed to persuade

"moderate"

Washington that any Indian attack, even a

officials were once again permitting the

Taliban forces.

limited one, on Pakistan could turn into a

Pakistani tail to wag the American dog.

major war, a notion that "intends to keep the

Washington flirted with permitting a govern-

Indians off balance and to keep the United

ment that was indirectly responsible for the

States worrying that there will be a major war

terrorism inflicted on America to impose a

between the two nuclear-armed adversaries

veto power on U.S. decisions, thereby ensur-

in South Asia if Washington does not stay

ing that Pakistan would not end up with a

India's hand."49

regime in Kabul dominated by the unfriend-

The Indians clearly have an advantage over

ly Northern Alliance.

Pakistan in conventional weapons; India has

But the Bush administration decided to

more than 1.3 million active-duty soldiers

continue pursuing the war during Ramadan

compared to barely 600,000 in Pakistan, and

and gave a green light to Northern Alliance

India also has more than a two-to-one advan-

forces to move toward Kabul. Musharraf

tage in combat aircraft as well as more tanks,

again tried to reduce his losses by demanding

artillery, and ships.50 Since India could defeat

that Kabul be "demilitarized" and that the

Pakistan in any conventional war, Pakistan's

Northern Alliance forces "must not" hold

it.53 Moreover, as revealed in reports in the

threat to use nuclear weapons (again, similar

to some extent to the Israeli "Samson Option")

New York Times and elsewhere (including

Seymour Hersh's exposé in the New Yorker),

was intended to send the message to the

Indians and the Americans that once a conflict

Islamabad continued to provide help to the

starts it is difficult to confine it. Moreover,

Taliban forces fighting against the United

while the Indians might try to confine the con-

States and its allies in Afghanistan.

flict to a conventional war, "it is the other side's

U.S. officials admitted that "one month

decision about how to respond" that will

after the Pakistan government agreed to end

determine the final outcome.51

its support of the Taliban, its intelligence

agency was still providing safe passage for

weapons and ammunition to arm them."54

Musharraf Fails to Achieve His Goal

Muharraf's strategy of resisting the U.S.

According to those reports, hundreds of

policy (backed by Russia and India) aimed at

Pakistani military officers and ISI agents pro-

bringing an end to the Pakistani-supported

vided support to the Taliban forces and

power arrangements in Afghanistan seemed

helped to evacuate 5,000 Taliban and al-

to be producing some results in the early

Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to

stages of the U.S. military effort. The Bush

Pakistan. Many of them were airlifted out of

administration initially responded positively

the northern Afghan city of Kunduz just

before it fell to the Northern Alliance.55 At

to Islamabad's calls for using diplomatic

means to capture bin Laden and his associ-

the same time, contrary to the nightmare sce-

ates. Even after the United States attacked

narios floated by Musharraf, the Pakistani

Afghanistan, reports from Washington

"street" did not erupt following the defeat of

reflected a willingness to suspend military

the Taliban, and there were no indications

operations during the holy month of

that Musharraf's hold on power was in dan-

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