From this perspective, September 11
have at his disposal any assets that would
should have accelerated a process of margin-
help him to strengthen his leverage on U.S.
alizing Pakistan. The Bush administration
policy, and he certainly had no military
decided, not only to target Pakistan's strate-
power to prevent the United States from
gic and ideological ally in Kabul, but to
attacking Afghanistan and using Pakistan's
destroy the entire jihad-international net-
airspace and territory to do so. His only
work that Pakistan's military-mosque nexus
remaining option was to warn the Americans
(in cooperation with its allies in Saudi
that their interests could be damaged if they
Arabia) was nourishing. At the same time, the
refused to accept his demands.
U.S. offensive against terrorism should have
He demonstrated his ability to advance
strengthened the hands of regional players
that strategy by using various signals to
that opposed Pakistan's strategic goals and
threaten the Americans that unless they
religious mission, including the Northern
modified their goals in the war on terrorism,
Alliance (fighting the Taliban) and Russia,
including the attack on Afghanistan, they
the Central Asian republics, India, and Iran.
would have to deal with two nightmare sce-
Washington's goal turned out to be the
narios: (a) a political backlash from the angry
ouster of the Pakistan-backed government in
"street" in Pakistan (and across the entire
Kabul and its replacement by a broad-based
Muslim world) that would lead to the col-
government that would be acceptable to
lapse of the "moderate" and "pro-Western"
those other powers as well as the United
Musharraf and his replacement by a radical
States. Ironically, that outcome was more or
Islamic regime and (b) a Pakistani version of
Israel's "Samson Option,"46 in which a
less what the Soviets had been pushing for
after their withdrawal from Afghanistan--
Pakistani regime, facing unacceptable pres-
and the United States and its "ally," Pakistan,
sures from the United States and India that
had resisted. (Bin Laden and his associates
threatened its core national interests and sur-
would not have found a refuge in such a
vival, would have no choice but to flex its
"neutral" Afghanistan.) After September 11,
nuclear military power, even if that led to a
Pakistan seemed to be the big loser with no
nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The lat-
other choice but to accept that outcome.
ter nightmare scenario also suggested that if
The alternative would have been to irrevo-
Musharraf resisted the pressure to threaten
cably alienate the United States, thus
to use nuclear weapons, he would be ousted
enabling India to formalize its position as the
by in a coup by more radical Islamic elements
dominant power in the region and perhaps
in the military who would do so, or the coun-
Musharraf
even provoking the Americans to give New
try might collapse into a civil war with vari-
Delhi a green or yellow light to unleash its
ous competing warlords getting access to the
proved to be an
military power on Pakistan (with only China
nuclear arsenal. Some of it might even fall
opportunistic
into the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.47
balancing India). From a systemic perspective,
September 11 helped to form a new balance
At a minimum, Musharraf proved to be
politician advanc-
of power, reestablishing the "red lines" that
an opportunistic politician advancing his
ing his interests
had disappeared after the collapse of the
interests vis-ŕ-vis the Americans as they took
vis-ŕ-vis the
Soviet superpower and impelling Washington
the first steps in their war on terrorism. He
to restrain its Pakistani client state.
succeeded in exploiting the unrest in
Americans as they
Pakistan and the terrorist acts by anti-Indian
took the first
Pakistan Invokes Frightening Specters
Muslim groups. The latter probably had
Hence, it is not surprising that
some assistance from elements in the
steps in their war
Musharraf's policies since September 11
Pakistani military and political establish-
on terrorism.
have been aimed at resisting those pressures
ment (with some level of "deniability,"
and at trying to maintain the status quo that
although the spin advanced by Musharraf
had benefited Pakistan. Musharraf didn't
and his supporters was that the ISI and some
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