Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Musharraf can be
toward the United States, Musharraf was now
nuclear nonproliferation regime spurred new
going to take dramatic steps to Westernize
moves to punish Pakistan for developing
described as a
and secularize Pakistan ŕ la Turkey. Indeed,
nuclear weapons (as well as purchasing relat-
new and
several analysts went so far as to compare
ed technology from China). Pakistan's sup-
improved Zia
Musharraf to modern Turkey's founder,
port for the Muslim insurgents that attacked
Kemal Ataturk,39 and to argue that his address
the town of Kargil in Kashmir in May 1999;
adapting an
"set a new course for the Muslim world."40
Islamabad's backing of the despicable
ambitious agenda
But Musharraf is no Ataturk dedicated to
Taliban regime, which Washington accused
demolishing the religious and expansionist
even then of harboring bin Laden's terrorist
to changing cir-
network;41 and Islamabad's decision to deto-
foundations of the ancient regime and estab-
cumstances.
lishing a new nationalist and secular identity
nate a nuclear bomb in May 1998 led to enor-
for his country. If anything, one can compare
mous U.S. pressure (in form of diplomatic
Musharraf to some of Turkey's last Ottoman
and economic sanctions) on Pakistan. That,
rulers, who tried to accommodate domestic
in turn, led to a reaction by Pakistan's mili-
and outside forces that aimed either to change
tary-mosque nexus.
the status quo or to secure the ambitious
The October 1999 military coup by
intertwining of the nationalist and religious
Musharraf brought an end to the fragile
goals of the empire. Indeed, Musharraf's rise
democracy in Pakistan and strengthened the
to power marked what can be regarded as the
hands of the Taliban's allies in Islamabad,
most recent attempt by members of the mili-
including the ISI, the radical religious groups,
tary-mosque nexus to preserve the achieve-
and forces pushing for the expansion of ties
ments of Zia and his successors: veto power of
with the jihad international, the "liberation"
the military, ideological supremacy of the rad-
of Kashmir, and the acceleration of the
ical Islamic groups, control of Afghanistan
nation's nuclear program. The latter goal was
through the Taliban, mounting pressure on
the development of an "Islamic bomb" that
India in Kashmir, and development of a
would not only enhance Pakistan's position
nuclear weapons capability.
vis-ŕ-vis India and the United States but would
In that context, Musharraf can be
also provide the Muslim world with an answer
described as a new and improved Zia adapt-
to the Western, Hindu, and Jewish (Israeli)
bombs.42 According to U.S. sources, one of the
ing an ambitious agenda to changing cir-
cumstances. Starting in the early 1990s, there
major reasons Musharraf and the military
were indications that changes in the regional
decided to oust Sharif was "the fear that he
and global balance of power were threatening
might buckle to American policy and reverse
Pakistan's policy toward the Taliban."43
the achievements gained by the military-
mosque nexus. The power of OPEC had been
Musharraf and his allies were not calling
eroded, weakening the economic and diplo-
for the "Talibanization" of Pakistan, but the
matic status of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan's bene-
policies they were advancing (either directly
factor and its top lobbyist in Washington.
or through the use of political and military
Worsening relations between Beijing and
subsidiaries and "rogue" operations) were
Washington made it difficult for Islamabad
based on using the Taliban's Afghanistan as
to accentuate Pakistan-China ties in bargain-
both a strategic and an Islamic backyard,
ing with the United States. The strengthen-
where training camps and arms depots could
ing of the human rights lobby in Congress
be used to promote the Pakistani-Islamic
produced growing criticism in Washington
cause in Kashmir and around the world.
of the rising influence of anti-democratic
According to recent news reports, that effort
and radical Islamic forces in Pakistan and, of
included cooperation between Pakistani
course, its fundamentalist ally in Kabul.
nuclear scientists and the al-Qaeda network--
The preoccupation of the Clinton admin-
although it is not certain whether Musharraf
knew personally of that collaboration.44
istration and Congress with enhancing the
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