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The Pakistani

conflict. The contrasting considerations of

power in South Asia in which India remained

U.S. and Pakistani national interests were

the leading military player. In fact, during the

nuclear program

clearly demonstrated in the growing ties

first three years of the Carter administration,

was a form of

between Islamabad and communist China in

the process of détente with the Soviet Union,

diplomatic black-

the 1960s and by the disastrous decision by

as well as the focus on human rights and

Pakistan to launch a war against India over

nuclear proliferation by the White House and

mail in

Kashmir in 1965, which led to Pakistan's mil-

Congress, meant that differences in national

Islamabad's rela-

itary defeat when the administration of

interests and values significantly weakened

Lyndon Johnson refused to bail out

U.S.-Pakistani ties. Evidence that Pakistan

tionship with

Islamabad from the mess it had created.

was accelerating the development of its

Washington.

The tensions between Pakistan and the

nuclear program, and Zia's military coup that

United States were reflected in another devel-

ousted the elected government of Zulfikar Ali

opment. Beginning in the 1970s Pakistan

Bhutto, brought relations to a nadir.

moved to develop a nuclear weapons capabil-

Pakistan's Reemergence as a Useful

ity to offset India's advantage in conventional

Client State in the 1980s

military power and as a response to India's

detonation of a nuclear device in 1974. The

Even before Zia arrived in Washington in

Pakistani nuclear program was also a form of

1982, however, there were indications that

diplomatic blackmail in Islamabad's relation-

not only was Pakistan reasserting its position

ship with Washington. Pakistani officials

as a useful client state for Washington but

insisted that only a sufficient supply of

that the normal pattern of relations between

American conventional arms would prevent

the global power, the United States, and the

Pakistan from going nuclear. But Pakistan's

client state, Pakistan, which had been evident

effort to become a nuclear power ran contrary

during most of the Cold War, was beginning

to another core U.S. national security interest:

to change in favor of the latter. The principal

working to block the proliferation of nuclear

reason for that change was the Soviet inva-

weapons and creating a stable international

sion of Afghanistan and the decision, first by

nuclear arms control regime (both during

the Carter administration and then by

and after the Cold War). The divergent goals

President Ronald Reagan and his advisers, to

of the two countries on the nuclear issue led

use Pakistan as a base to support the

to numerous diplomatic showdowns (espe-

mujahideen in Afghanistan as part of a strat-

cially under pressure from Congress).

egy to oust the Soviets from that country.

When one analyzes the relationship

That Pakistan was able to strengthen its

between Washington and Pakistan before the

leverage over Washington was a result of

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, what

global and regional developments. One

emerges is the normal pattern of relationship

development was increasing anti-Soviet

between a great power and a client state. Each

cooperation between the United States and

side refrained from abandoning its commit-

China. Pakistan could be integrated into that

ments to its respective core national interests,

cooperation since it was a friend of both

but Pakistan was eventually forced to back

countries. Another development was the

down from its aggressive pursuit of those

expansion of ties between Pakistan and the

interests. Indeed, the limits of U.S. support

Arab countries, led by oil-rich Saudi Arabia

led to the partition of Pakistan and the estab-

and bolstered by the rising global economic

lishment of Bangladesh following India's

power of the oil cartel, OPEC, that was exert-

military victory in its 1971 war with Pakistan.

ing enormous pressure on U.S. foreign poli-

In those and other cases, Washington was

cy. Many of the Arab states regarded Pakistan

not willing to provide Pakistan with the mili-

not only as a strategic ally (containing Soviet

tary and diplomatic support needed to

expansionism toward the Middle East) but

change in any dramatic way the balance of

also as a religious and cultural associate com-

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