having no choice but to abruptly end
Musharraf's Self-Serving
Pakistan's support of both the Taliban and
Switch
the militants seeking to "liberate" Kashmir.
It is hyperbole to portray Musharraf's
Pakistan and America:
decision to cooperate with the United States
The History of a Turbulent
after September 11 as a courageous, de
Gaullelike gesture. Instead, Musharraf can
Relationship
be compared to another military dictator,
Hungary's Adm. Nikolaus Horthy de
Most of Musharraf's predecessors were
Nagybanya, a backer of Nazi Germany who
aware that Islamabad's ties with Washington
had come to power with support from a mil-
were dictated by specific political-military
itary-fascist nexus. In 1944, sensing that the
interests and lacked any deep historical and
balance of power was shifting against the
ideological roots. As is Musharraf, those lead-
Axis powers, Horthy attempted to defect
ers were always more candid than the
from his alliance with Adolf Hitler and
Americans in evaluating their country's ties
switch his support to the Allies. Like Admiral
with Washington in realpolitik terms that
Almost two
Horthy in 1944, General Musharraf in 2001
stressed the limitations of the relationship.
decades before
recognized that his fanatical ally was
Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War--
doomed and attempted to realign his coun-
when U.S. officials, lawmakers, and commen-
Musharraf, U.S.
try with the victorious West. Horthy failed in
tators were hailing (and some conservatives
leaders embraced
his gamble, whereas Musharraf has been suc-
were even romanticizing) U.S.-Pakistani coop-
another Pakistani
cessful (so far). But that success should not
eration in providing support to the Muslim
diminish the significance of the historical
"freedom fighters" in Afghanistan (including
military dictator,
analogy. Horthy and Musharraf were simply
one named Osama bin Laden) and Pakistan
Gen. Mohammed
switching to the winning side, well aware that
was the recipient of the third largest amount
the alternative would bring about their own
U.S. aid (after Israel and Egypt)--Pakistani
Zia ul-Haq.
political destruction.22
leaders seemed to have no illusions about their
There was no conversion to Western val-
relationship with Washington. They recog-
ues in either case. New York Times columnist
nized that the U.S.-Pakistani partnership in
Thomas Friedman invoked Samuel
Afghanistan was a marriage of convenience, if
Johnson's quip, "There is nothing like the
not a diplomatic and military one-night stand,
prospect of being hanged in the morning to
and that the two governments would eventual-
concentrate the mind," to provide an expla-
ly have to deal with the reality of their diverging
nation of Musharraf's decision to abandon
core national interests and values.
his alliance with the Taliban and support
Almost two decades before Musharraf, U.S.
U.S. policy. Friedman suggested that
leaders embraced another Pakistani military
Musharraf's moves were motivated by
dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. The
realpolitik considerations, the diplomatic
general played a pivotal role, putting in place
and economic pressure from Washington,
the policies of relying on the support of radi-
and the lurking military threat of India.
cal Islamic groups at home. In late 1982 he
Because of the September 11 attacks, and the
came to Washington to help coordinate sup-
subsequent attack on the Indian parliament
port for the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan.
by pro-Pakistan Kashmiri terrorists, the
The difference between the way the leaders of
United States and India "made clear that
Pakistan and the United States have tended to
Pakistan's foreign policy had to change--or
depict their relationship was evident during a
America would destroy it economically and
December 6, 1982, meeting in Washington
India [would do so] militarily."23 Thus,
between General Zia and Secretary of State
Musharraf found himself in the position of
George Shultz.
6