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that, as a result of the no-war pacts, Islam was

A More Nuanced and

"strengthened," he emphasized that later on

Cynical Perspective from

"when people saw enemies getting together,

they made a new war pact."16

Islamabad

What Musharraf was describing was not

While American officials were going out  the basis for the new strategic alliance with

of their way to applaud the new, improved  Washington, based on long-term interests and

friendship with Pakistan and portray  shared values, that American officials and pun-

Musharraf as Pakistan's version of Charles de  dits seemed to be demanding of him. Instead,

Gaulle, taking major risks in joining the West  he was proposing merely a tactical accord with

and standing up to radical forces threatening  the United States, a nation whose interests and

to overrun his country and region,  values were on many levels contrary to those

Musharraf adopted a more nuanced view.  espoused by Pakistan as a state and as a repre-

The Pakistani leader took a more ambiguous  sentative of Islamic aspirations. Such an agree-

and restrained approach toward Islamabad's  ment between Islamabad and Washington

ties with Washington and expressed only a would help advance Pakistan's short-term

qualified backing for the U.S. position.

strategic interests, or at least not harm them.

He did that in a lengthy televised address

Conversely, rejecting cooperation with

to the Pakistani people on September 19, fol-  Washington would provoke American wrath

lowing consultations with many of the coun-  and place at risk Pakistan's aid-dependent

try's opinion leaders. Musharraf referred to  economy, the country's ability to stand up to

the dilemma Pakistan was facing as it had to  India, and perhaps its nuclear installations. A

choose between "two adversities"--con-  breach with the United States might allow

frontation or cooperation with the United  India to exploit the situation to isolate and

States (and the West). He concluded that in  hurt Pakistan and could lead to the installa-

such a case Islamic law requires that one  tion of an anti-Pakistan regime in Kabul.

choose the lesser adversity (in this instance,  "Bad results," Musharraf stressed in his

cooperation with Washington). He com-  address, "could put in danger our territorial

pared his move to the temporary cease-fires  integrity and our solidarity."

that Muslim leaders had signed with nonbe-

Cooperation with Washington would

lievers in the early stages of Muslim history  provide Pakistan with breathing space until

to provide the Muslims with an opportunity  it was ready to secure its core national inter-

to gain strength and expand their influence.  ests, which included, as Musharraf pointed

The Pakistani

After a needed respite, those agreements were  out, developing its nuclear weapons capabili-

repealed. The conclusion of such an agree-  ty and defending the "Kashmir cause." While

leader took an

ment with the United States would likewise  American leaders and commentators were

ambiguous and

ensure that the interests of Islam would be  hailing a metamorphosis in Pakistani poli-

protected, explained Musharraf.

cies, Musharraf was expressing his hope that

restrained

Although it is possible that his comments  working with Washington would enable

approach toward

were a cynical rationale purely for domestic  Islamabad to maintain the status quo, albeit

Islamabad's ties

consumption, it is more likely that Musharraf  modified, in Kabul by helping to put in place

was applying the lessons of Muslim history  a friendly Islamic government. Much as the

with Washington

and teachings to make an argument in favor of  Taliban regime had done during the 1990s,

and expressed

a short-term accommodation with the power-  such a successor would help secure

ful nonbelievers of the day, the Americans. The  Pakistan's twin policies: maintaining influ-

only a qualified

implication of his remarks was that such an  ence in Central Asia and exerting pressure on

backing for the

accord could be abrogated in the future when  India to settle the dispute over Kashmir, a

U.S. position.

the balance of power would shift in favor of  Muslim-majority state divided between the

Pakistan and the Muslim community. Noting  two countries.

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