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cy to the list of military and civilian positions

to demonstrate strengthening U.S. ties with

he held) committed his government to sup-

Islamabad, including pledges of military and

port the American-led antiterrorism cam-

economic assistance. The Bush administra-

paign.8 In the October 10 press conference

tion and Congress moved to lift the sanc-

with Bush, Musharraf stressed that his gov-

tions that had been imposed after Pakistan

ernment had taken a decision "to be a part of

(following in India's footsteps) detonated

the coalition, to be with the United States, to

nuclear  devices  in  1998  and  after

fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it

Musharraf's 1999 coup suspended democra-

exists." He expressed his confidence about

cy. Washington also agreed to reschedule

the "dawn of a new era of a relationship

Pakistan's outstanding debt to the United

between Pakistan and the United States."9

States of about $400 million and to support

Helping to advance the Musharraf-is-a

loan rescheduling by various financial insti-

courageous-leader and Pakistan-is-our-ally

tutions, including the World Bank, the

theses perpetuated by Islamabad and

International Monetary Fund, and the Asian

Washington was the domestic backdrop

Development Bank, thus helping to alleviate

against which Musharraf adopted the new

Pakistan's $38 billion foreign debt.

policy and made the statements advocating

Finally, Washington offered Musharraf an

Washington

cooperation with the United States. The con-

aid package of nearly $1 billion for border

offered

ventional wisdom in Washington was that

control, refugee assistance, and poverty alle-

Pakistan's current government could find

viation. (Pakistan claimed that the war in

Musharraf an aid

itself struggling for survival if it were seen

Afghanistan was costing it more than $2.5

package of nearly

domestically as a lapdog of American infi-

billion is lost trade, commerce, and tourism.)

$1 billion for bor-

dels.10 Indeed, a Gallup poll of Pakistanis

By the end of 2001, the IMF and the Paris

published in October indicated that 83 per-

Club of sovereign creditors pronounced

der control,

cent of them sympathized with the Taliban

themselves pleased with Pakistan's "econom-

refugee assis-

rather than the United States, while 82 per-

ic progress," rescheduled much of the coun-

try's debt, and extended fresh credits.13

cent considered bin Laden a holy warrior, not

tance, and pover-

a terrorist.11

To be sure, there were limits to U.S. conces-

ty alleviation.

The Pakistani press was saturated with

sions. The Bush administration rejected

conspiracy theories that suggested that Israel

Pakistan's request for delivery of 28 F-16s paid

was behind the September 11 attacks, while

for in the 1980s but never delivered because of

thousands of Pakistanis demonstrated

Pakistan's  nuclear  weapons  program.

against the United States in Islamabad,

Islamabad's nuclear program caused succes-

Karachi, and other major cities. U.S. media

sive U.S. administrations to apply the Pressler

coverage during the first few days of the cam-

Amendment (which required an annual certi-

paign against al-Qaeda depicted "rabid anti-

fication by the White House that Pakistan did

not posses nuclear weapons)14 and impose

Americanism in daily protests in Pakistan,"

contributing to the perception that

sanctions against Islamabad. And, facing pres-

Musharraf's pro-American tilt might cost

sure from U.S. textile and apparel manufac-

him his power if not his life.12

turers, the administration was reluctant to

support the request by Pakistan, which

exported $1.9 billion in textile products to the

Washington Rewards

United States in the year ending July 2001, to

Pakistan

temporarily suspend textile and apparel tariffs

and quotas. Nevertheless, as one journalist

It was not surprising therefore that

noted, "Pakistan has become the biggest bene-

Musharraf's statements and actions were

ficiary of economic aid in return for its sup-

rewarded not only by Washington's official

port of the U.S. antiterrorism campaign

in Afghanistan."15

praise but, more important, by concrete steps

3