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Islamabad

becoming an unreliable "failed state." There

Introduction: Allies Again?  were signs of the country's "Talibanization,"

seemed to be

that is, the growing strength of radical Islam.

emerging as a

Two months after the terrorist attacks in  Pakistan also seemed to be a source of insta-

promoter of ter-

New York and Washington, President Bush  bility in South Asia and to pose a challenge to

praised Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez  America's nuclear nonproliferation policy.

rorism, not

Musharraf, for showing "ever greater courage,  Worst of all, Islamabad seemed to be emerg-

unlike such

vision and leadership" in supporting the U.S.  ing as a promoter of terrorism, not unlike

war against terrorism, including the military  such "rogue states" as Iran and North Korea.5

"rogue states" as

campaign to oust the Taliban regime in

That perception was partly transformed

Iran and North

Afghanistan and capture the leaders of al-  after September 11, when Pakistan became a

Korea.

Qaeda. Musharraf's "efforts against terror are  critical theater in the U.S. effort to take the

benefiting the entire world," Bush said at a fight to the terrorists. Musharraf did an

November  10  press  conference  with  effective job of realigning Pakistan with

Musharraf at his side.1 His comment echoed a  Washington's policy. On the eve of the U.S.

statement made by British prime minister  attack on Afghanistan, Islamabad offered

Tony Blair on October 5, during a visit to  intelligence, air space, and ground facilities

Islamabad, in which he thanked the Pakistani  for the U.S.-led operation to dislodge

leader for his "courage and leadership" in  Afghanistan's Taliban regime and capture

committing his country to support the war  Osama bin Laden and his associates.

on terrorism.2 In a joint U.S.-Pakistani state-

Pakistan not only allowed U.S. troops to

ment issued during the Pakistani leader's visit  be based in key airfields near the Afghan bor-

to the United States, Bush and Musharraf  der; it agreed to freeze the bank accounts of

"reaffirmed the benefits of 50 years of friend-  four Islamist organizations with ties to al-

ship and close cooperation between Pakistan  Qaeda.6 Those moves were followed by the fir-

and the United States" and "welcomed the  ing of Ahmed Mahmoud, director-general of

revival of this longstanding partnership" as a  the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence;

"vital element" in the construction of region-  Muzaffer Usmani, deputy chief of the army

al and global stability and peace.3

staff; and other senior generals who had been

The statements by Bush and other U.S.  key players in Musharraf's 1999 coup but

officials that followed the start of the U.S.-led  who were known to have radical Islamic views

anti-terrorism campaign and the indications  and were reputed to be staunch supporters of

that Pakistan was willing to join it marked a  the Taliban regime. They were replaced by

sharp shift in the relationship between  military officers whose thinking was more in

Washington and Islamabad, which had expe-  line with Musharraf's new policy toward

rienced a steep decline during the last years of  Kabul. "The Taliban's days are numbered,"

the administrations of George H. W. Bush  declared Musharraf.7

and Bill Clinton. The Cold War and the com-

Indeed, in various statements, Musharraf

mon struggle against the Soviet occupation  accentuated Pakistan's role as an ally of the

of Afghanistan no longer cemented U.S.-  United States and pledged to Washington his

Pakistani ties in the 1990s, leading a veteran  nation's "fullest cooperation in the fight

analyst to conclude that, in the absence of  against terrorism." In an official statement

other "significant shared national interests,"  issued on September 13, Musharraf con-

tensions between the two nations were  demned the terrorist attacks, saying that the

becoming all too apparent.4

"carnage in New York and Washington has

In fact, the growing consensus among  raised this struggle to a new level." And in a

American policymakers and lawmakers was  meeting with U.S. Ambassador Wendy

that Pakistan was not only losing its strategic  Chamberlain, the self-appointed president

importance to the United States; it was also  (in June 2001 Musharraf added the presiden-

2