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No. 436

May 8, 2002

Pakistan in America's War

against Terrorism

Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client?

by Leon T. Hadar

Executive Summary

The September 11 attacks on New York and

and presided over a corrupt and mismanaged

Washington and the ensuing U.S.-led war on ter-

economy. Despite that record, he is being hailed

rorism have given Pakistan's military dictator,

by the Bush administration as a "courageous" and

Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity to

"visionary" leader who is ready to reorient his

improve the relationship between Washington

country toward a pro-American position and

and Islamabad. That relationship had experienced

adopt major political and economic reforms. In

a steep decline in the 1990s, as the end of both the

exchange for his belated support, Musharraf has

Cold War and the common struggle against the

been rewarded with U.S. diplomatic backing and

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the per-

substantial economic aid.

ception of shared strategic interests. Moreover,

Musharraf's decision to join the U.S. war on ter-

while it was losing its strategic significance to the

rorism didn't reflect a structural transformation in

United States, Pakistan was coming under the

Pakistan's policy. It was a result of tactical consider-

control of an assertive military-religious nexus

ations aimed at limiting the losses that Islamabad

that promoted anti-American radical Islamic

would suffer because of the collapse of the friendly

forces at home and abroad.

Taliban regime in Kabul. Rejecting cooperation

Since September 11, General Musharraf,

with Washington would have provoked American

whose regime had been the main source of diplo-

wrath and placed at risk Pakistan's strategic and

matic and military support for the terrorist

economic interests in South Asia.

Taliban ruling neighboring Afghanistan, has por-

Some cooperation between the United States

trayed his regime as an ally of Washington in its

and Pakistan is necessary to wage the war against

counterterrorism campaign. Musharraf, though,

terrorism, but that cooperation must not evolve

headed a military clique that brought an end to

into a new long-term strategic alliance.

his nation's short democratic experience, assisted

Washington should view Pakistan, with its dicta-

radical Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan

torship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear arse-

and Kashmir, pressed for a war with India,

nal, as a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals at best

advanced Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,

and as a potential long-term problem at worst.

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Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author of Quagmire:

America in the Middle East.