Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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· Cuban
what we learned on visits to Cuba in February
Americans, who support the
and April­May 2001 to present a considered
embargo much more widely than any
overview of current conditions. On that basis,
other group in the United States, also
we analyze whether, in the light of those con-
violate it most frequently and signifi-
ditions, current U.S. policy is likely to produce
cantly. By sending remittances to the
the desired effect of inducing the Cuban
island they always violate the embar-
authorities to "see the errors of their ways" and
go's spirit and sometimes violate its
to introduce the changes that would so great-
legal restrictions as well.
· The vast majority of those who are
ly benefit the Cuban people. This paper is
based in part on extensive discussions that
intended to be the chief beneficiaries of
were held with Cuban officials, private-sector
U.S. policy (the Cuban people and the
individuals, dissidents, and foreign diplomats
country's human rights and political
as well as personal observations and
activists) by all available evidence
exchanges with ordinary Cubans in Havana,
oppose the embargo and are at best
Pinar del Rio, Playa Girón, Cienfuegos,
skeptical of the value of U.S. official
Trinidad, Camaguey, Bayamo, Santiago, and
financial aid to the opposition in Cuba.
· As estimated by the U.S. International
points in between. It draws on those discus-
Absent national
sions and observations to set out possible
Trade Commission, U.S. firms are los-
security threats,
implications for U.S. policy.
ing out to foreign competition in an
Cuba is a complex and complicated soci-
amount ranging anywhere from $684
the U.S. govern-
ety. With the instruments of totalitarian con-
million to $1.2 billion per annum.
ment does not
trol still in place, it is also a society where
have the right to
appearances are deceiving. Statements by
Those realities are significant. But U.S. pol-
public officials are rarely gospel truth.
icy toward Cuba is based more on emotions,
prohibit the trav-
Official statistics and interpretations of law
domestic political calculations, and historical
el and business of
are not necessarily reliable. Legislation tends
inertia than on rational calculation. Thus it
to follow practice--rather than the other way
turns its back on central principles of
American citizens
around. Nonetheless, even allowing for those
American democracy: that, absent national
abroad.
caveats, certain conclusions can be drawn.
security threats, the U.S. government does not
The chief ones follow.
have the right to prohibit the travel and busi-
ness of American citizens abroad and that eco-
· The United States and Cuba are essen-
nomic freedom tends to breed political free-
dom. The policy thus fails to advance U.S.
tially coconspirators in misrepresent-
interests and U.S. values effectively. The Bush
ing the effects of the embargo as more
administration should undertake a funda-
significant than is in fact the case. The
mental review of the U.S. approach to Cuba.
Cuban economy is not flourishing, but
The first step could be a revival of the pro-
it is also no longer backsliding.
· With the enthusiastic cooperation of
posed presidential bipartisan commission to
evaluate the policy that was killed by President
many of the United States' closest allies
Clinton in January 1999.9
(Canada, the European Union, and
Israel), Cuba has found ways to work
around the U.S. embargo so as to
Conditions in Cuba Today
weather the demise of the Soviet Union
and more recent storms such as
increases in world energy prices.
Cubans and some foreign observers have
· Economic deprivation is a moderate
long pointed to Castro's health and educa-
tion programs as examples of the success of
but not a major source of social ten-
the revolution. To be sure, when Castro took
sion. It does not appear to be an engine
power in 1959, he inherited a nation with
of political reform.
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