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· The Special Interests Dilemma: Because

ment in the economy, the prospects for get-

ting rid of many corporate welfare programs

the members of the commission would

are brighter than before.

not be incumbent lawmakers, there

Ending corporate welfare will require

would be substantially reduced, if any,

altering the incentives of legislators. No one

incentives for the members to think

senator or representative will vote for a bill

about reelection prospects or other

that lowers the budget for his or her favored

political factors. Admittedly, there

program without a corresponding decrease

would still be special interest pressure

in someone else's favored program. In other

on the commission. Instead of lobbying

words, no one wants to unilaterally defund a

members of Congress, supporters of cor-

favorite program since the money will just be

porate welfare programs would lobby

reallocated elsewhere. Also, member of

the commission. However, the political

Congress A knows that voting for a decrease

dynamic would be different enough that

in member B's favored program might result

lobbying would be likely to be less, if at

in future reprisals. That is the reason that

all, effective.

·

tackling these programs one by one, or in a

The  Collective  Choice  Dilemma:

small group, during the appropriations

Because every program would be termi-

process is not likely to yield results (it yielded

nated by an up-or-down vote on an una-

no results when it was tried during the FY

mendable bill, there would be no vote

2000 appropriations cycle). An institutional

trading on the specifics of the bill as

problem of this sort requires an institutional

there is during the normal appropria-

solution.

tions process. The commission would

One promising solution is to create a cor-

have the ability to cast a wider net and

porate welfare reform commission (CWRC).60

create a list of programs that would hit a

larger number of special interest con-

General guidelines for a bill creating a CWRC

stituencies than any one member of, or

could be as follows:

group within, Congress would propose.

· The

To avoid other attendant political

commission would not be com

-

dynamics, the commission could pre-

posed of sitting members of Congress. It

sent to Congress its list of program ter-

would be chosen by bipartisan agree-

minations in a nonelection year.

ment between the president and the

leadership of both houses of Congress.

· The commission would convene for the

The CWRC has an ancestor in the Base

Realignment and Closure Commission. The

purpose of proposing a list of corporate

Ending corporate

BRAC grew out of the understanding that

welfare programs that should be elimi-

welfare will

even though the military base structure at

nated.

· The commission would address only

require altering

the time "made little sense on the whole,

Congress could not bring itself to close spe-

spending programs, not tax preferences

the incentives of

cific bases."6 1 That is because, during the 10

in the budget, and no corporate welfare

legislators.

spending programs should be consid-

years before BRAC, "Congress prohibited

ered "off the table."

studies of whether bases should be closed,

· The commission's list of recommended

required an environmental impact statement

for any proposed closure, and attached riders

program terminations would be voted

to appropriations bills to bar the spending of

on by both houses of Congress, with no

funds to close particular bases."6 2 Although

amendments, within 60 days of the com

-

mission's final report.

many members of Congress wanted to close

military bases in the abstract, they were rarely

A commission structured along those

willing to vote for a bill that would close a

lines would solve two main problems:

base in their district. As in the case of corpo-

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