Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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That the United
relying on the United States for security, the
locked in a deepening, intense economic
Marshall Plan and NATO "were the two
rivalry. And, as "successor generations" came
States and
things which prevented a unity in Europe,
to power on both sides of the Atlantic, the
Europe are des-
which in the long run may be more valuable
sense of a common Euro-Atlantic identity--
tined to drift
than either of them."4 7
forged by the struggles of postwar recovery
In historical perspective, the EU's contin-
and the dangers of the early Cold War years--
apart politically
uing march toward political unity, and its
faded. With the Cold War's passing, those
and strategically
quest for military self-sufficiency expressed
factors gnaw away at the alliance's fabric at
an accelerated pace.48
is increasingly
in ESDP and the RRF, represent the triumph
of the hopes for Europe held by Eisenhower,
This time, however, there is no common
evident. The only
Dulles, and other leading U.S. policymakers
external threat to hold the fissiparous forces
issue is how this
during the late 1940s and 1950s. They saw
at bay and keep the alliance together.
the emergence of a stable, prosperous, and
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Kosovo
distancing occurs.
independent Europe as the sine qua non for
conflict, Europe predictably is beginning to
an exit strategy that would allow the United
respond to American hegemony by balancing
States to bring its troops back from Europe.
against the United States. That the United
But they also viewed the emergence of such a
States and Europe are destined to drift apart
Europe as the vindication of American ideals
politically and strategically is increasingly
and as the foundation for a healthy long-
evident. The only issue is how this distancing
term U.S.-European relationship.
occurs. An amicable separation is better than
a nasty divorce. For the former to happen,
however, the United States will need to give
Toward a New Transatlantic
up its hegemonic pretensions and accept
Relationship
Europe's emergence as an equal power center
in international politics. Whether the U.S.
foreign policy elite is prepared to accept
Although some people--though surely not
gracefully the transition from unipolarity to
Eisenhower and Dulles were they alive today--
multipolarity is, however, an open question.
might find it ironic, America's best hope for
That is the question that the Bush adminis-
retaining a healthy relationship with Europe
tration will be called upon to answer.
lies in cutting NATO's Gordian knot of con-
tradictions, resentments, and illusions. A U.S.-
European relationship based on mutual inde-
Notes
pendence, equality, and autonomy likely will
prove far stronger than NATO, the bonds of
1. Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Teriff, and
which are fast being corroded by the recrimi-
Mark Webber, "NATO's Triple Challenge,"
International Affairs 76, no. 3 (July 2000): 503.
nations generated by America's dominance
Emphasis in original.
and Europe's subordination.
NATO's days are numbered, and Kosovo
2. Ibid., p. 504.
is likely to be remembered as the last
3. Ibid.
American war in Europe. The threat posed by
the Soviet Union was the glue that simulta-
4. Joseph Fitchett, "EU Force Takes Shape with
neously held the alliance together and legiti-
Pledges of Troops," International Herald Tribune,
mated U.S. hegemony in Europe. Yet, even
November 20, 2000; and "EU to Shape Reaction
Force," International Herald Tribune, November 18,
during the Cold War--especially from the
2000.
mid-1960s on--NATO's cohesion was erod-
ing. U.S. and Western European political and
5. Philip Webster, Richard Beeston, and Martin
strategic interests often conflicted sharply.
Fletcher, "French Trigger NATO Furore," Times
(London), December 8, 2000; Michael Evans,
Though allied against the Soviet Union, the
"Chirac Blows Cover of New European Army,"
United States and Western Europe were
Times (London), December 8, 2000; George Jones
11