ger pointed at NATO's heart."1 2
force with a chain of command, headquarters,
and planning staff separate from NATO.5
The U.S.-EU controversy about the RRF is
the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Underlying
Those statements fanned some dissension
the current discord are fundamental ques-
within the EU itself, because Britain--with its
tions about the nature of the U.S.-European
traditionally Atlanticist rather than European
relationship, about American grand strategy,
orientation in security affairs--denied that the
and about the alliance itself. Inevitably, the
RRF would constitute an independent
European military capability outside NATO.6
new administration will have to come to
grips with the question of whether NATO--
Although Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed
in its current form--has a future.
that the French were forced at Nice to back
At first blush, Washington's vehement
away from viewing the RRF as an autonomous
opposition to ESDP and the RRF seems puz-
European force, this appears not to have been
the case.7 At Nice, and again several days later
zling, because the EU's initiatives appear to
respond positively to long-standing U.S.
at the NATO foreign ministers meeting, the
complaints--as old as the alliance itself--that
French continued to insist that the RRF
the Europeans are not pulling their weight in
indeed would be separate from NATO. For
providing for the Continent's security.
example, after Nice, French defense minister
The U.S. reaction
Perhaps the most recent reiteration of
Alan Richard stated that the RRF was merely
to the RRF was
American concerns about inequitable "bur-
the first step toward developing a full-fledged
EU army.8 And, at the NATO foreign ministers
den sharing" was delivered in October 2000
swift and hostile.
during the presidential campaign by
meeting, a French official claimed that an
Condoleezza Rice, who now is President
independent European defense policy was
Bush's national security adviser. Rice caused
inevitable: "The train is already moving.
one of the campaign's few foreign policy con-
NATO is not on board. It is not the engine. It
troversies by proposing a new "division of
is not in the tender or even in the passenger
compartment. It is still on the platform."9
labor" within NATO that would make the
Western Europeans responsible for peace-
keeping duties, such as those in the Balkans,
A Strident U.S. Response
while U.S. forces gave priority to meeting
The U.S. reaction to the RRF was swift
looming security challenges in East Asia and
and hostile. Speaking at a NATO defense
the Persian Gulf and Middle East.1 3 In this
ministers meeting in Brussels just prior to
the Nice summit, thensecretary of defense
light, the reported opposition of some poten-
William Cohen declared that if the EU creat-
tial Bush administration advisers to the RRF
ed an independent defense capability outside
is doubly surprising, because European poli-
the alliance's structure, NATO would
cymakers have suggested that the RRF could
become a "relic of the past."1 0 Cohen's com
take over from NATO and the United States
-
precisely those kinds of Balkan-style peace-
ments were a toned-down version of reports
keeping missions with which Washington
from within the Pentagon that the United
seems increasingly disenchanted.1 4
States would respond to the EU's approval of
the RRF by withdrawing its own military
presence from Europe.1 1 Anti-RRF senti-
The Historical Context
ments appear likely to carry over to the Bush
of the Present Crisis
administration. Several days after the Nice
summit, John Bolton, who was then vice
president of the American Enterprise
To understand why the U.S.-EU dispute
Institute and has since been nominated as
has become so acrimonious, it is necessary to
under secretary of state for arms control and
place the current crisis in historical context
international security affairs in the Bush
and, in the process, come to grips with the
administration, described the RRF as "a dag-
paradox of America's European policy: while
3