The RRF is to be
Initiative--was born at the January 1994 meet-
Introduction
ing of the North Atlantic Council. The intent
available for use
was to give the Western Europeans a greater
in ethnic con-
One of the first foreign policy challenges
voice and role within NATO. According to
flicts, humanitari-
the Bush administration must confront is
four NATO scholars, "From the outset . . .
the changing nature of the transatlantic rela-
ESDI was always a NATO military project, essen-
an interventions,
tionship. For several years, U.S. policymakers
tially designed to solve a number of structural
and peacekeeping
have been increasingly apprehensive about
and political problems within the Euro-
Atlantic community."1 However, at the EU's
operations in
the European Union's deepening political
integration. Specifically, they worry that the
Cologne (January 1999) and Helsinki
which NATO--or,
EU's goal of pursuing an autonomous for-
(December 1999) summits, ESDI was rechris-
more precisely,
eign and security policy--known as the
tened ESDP, and it took on a new cast "as an
European Security and Defence Policy--will
inherent part of the EU's long-term political
the United
agenda."2 Unlike ESDI, which essentially was
undermine NATO's role as the primary guar-
States--chooses
antor of European security and thereby
one in a long line of NATO burden-sharing
not to participate.
undermine Washington's dominance in the
initiatives, ESDP aims to establish an inde-
transatlantic relationship.
pendent European security policy; that is, a
U.S.-European differences on the proper
security policy determined by the Europeans
themselves without American input.3
relationship between ESDP and NATO came
sharply into focus during the Clinton admin-
The EU's Rapid Reaction Force
istration's closing months. During that peri-
od, the United States and its European allies
The implications of ESDP for NATO were
became locked in an increasingly bitter dis-
thrown into clear relief when the EU, at its
pute about the relationship between the EU's
November 2000 defense ministers meeting,
proposed Rapid Reaction Force and NATO--
formally announced plans to create a 60,000-
specifically, whether the RRF should be
strong RRF, to be operational by 2003. EU
embedded within the NATO framework or
members made specific commitments to
constitute an autonomous European mili-
contribute troops and equipment to the
RRF.4 The RRF is to be available for use in
tary capability separate from NATO. Because
this controversy was not resolved before the
ethnic conflicts, humanitarian interventions,
Clinton administration left office, the Bush
and peacekeeping operations in which
administration will be compelled to tackle it.
NATO--or, more precisely, the United
States--chooses not to participate.
Disagreement between the United States
Development of the EU's
and the EU regarding how far the
Security and Defense Policy
"Europeanization" of the Continent's defense
should go boiled over during the run-up to,
and aftermath of, the EU's December 2000
The current crisis has roots reaching back
summit meeting in Nice, France. That funda-
to the 1970s, when the European Community
mental disagreement was precipitated by a
(as the EU then was known) began discussing
seemingly arcane dispute about the RRF's
the need for a cooperative foreign and security
command and control and planning arrange-
policy. Following the Maastricht Treaty and
ments. Immediately before the Nice summit,
Single European Act (199192), the EU came
European Commission president Romano
to regard a common foreign and defense poli-
Prodi, French president Jacques Chirac, and
cy not simply as an aspiration for the future
French prime minister Lionel Jospin all indi-
but as a necessary complement to Europe's
cated that, although the RRF would draw on
deepening economic and political integration.
European military assets also earmarked for
Ironically, the forerunner to ESDP and the
NATO, it would be an autonomous European
RRF--the European Security and Defense
2