Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
The institutional-
ery of intelligence--the so-called national
data would compromise the secrecy of infor-
technical means--to more peaceful applica-
mation about tank movements? As Ronald
ized secrecy of the
tions provides a continuing mission and the
Deibert, a professor of political science at the
intelligence agen-
possibility that the public, after decades of
University of Toronto, has pointed out, "The
cies might have a
ambivalence about the agencies' methods,
history of U.S. intelligence as a whole is
could become a lot more sympathetic. The
marked by incidents of public duplicity and
profoundly nega-
intelligence community claims that it has for
subterfuge to such an extent that manipula-
tive effect on the
years been collecting data that are unavail-
tion of environmental data would not be out
of character."55
able to the civilian world and that could give
whole program of
a remarkably detailed picture of environmen-
Current efforts may please some environ-
environmental
tal change over the past three or four
mentalists, but they run the risk of seeing envi-
intelligence.
decades, especially in the days before civilian
ronmental monitoring by satellite co-opted by
satellites started operating. The intelligence
the intelligence community. That could hap-
community's environmental monitoring role
pen as commercial satellites are increasingly
could be of added use in checking other
used by military agencies, and civilian satellite
countries' compliance with international
systems are consolidated with military ones. If
treaties, such as the London Convention on
such co-option occurs, agencies such as the
Dumping or the Kyoto Protocol, the argu-
National Reconnaissance Office may become
ment runs. Such monitoring could also pro-
"a `clearing house' for environmental data
vide early warning of natural or man-made
with all of the attendant problems of [a]
deeply ingrained secrecy culture."56
disasters and help to prevent deliberate envi-
ronmental modification in wartime.5 1
Nonetheless, there are obvious objections
Security or Insecurity?
to the use of intelligence technologies to fur-
How Pursuing Environment-
ther environmental policies. First, intelli-
gence gathering and environmental monitor-
al Goals Endangers Peace
ing require different approaches. As Angelo
and Promotes Unwarranted
Codevilla, a professor of international rela-
Intervention
tions at Boston University, has argued: "The
purpose of intelligence is to ferret out secrets
from people who want to keep those secrets.
The potential for militarization of the
To turn intelligence into environmental
environment is only the first objection to
reports is not to understand environmental
linking environmental degradation with
problems or intelligence."52 Second, the insti-
national security. The second objection, as
already noted, is that the linkage could actu-
tutionalized secrecy of the intelligence agen-
ally lead to a decrease in security because
cies might have a profoundly negative effect
some activities might cause resentment over-
on the whole program of environmental
seas or even lead to war. In addition, pursuit
intelligence. Data could be manipulated,
of environmental goals overseas without
especially where they interfered with other
national security interests.53 John Deutch
regard to their cost and potential returns is
imprudent at best and encourages extortion
claimed in 1996 that "national reconnais-
on the part of foreign governments with
sance systems that track the movement of
domestic environmental problems.
tanks through the desert can, at the same
time, track the movement of the desert itself,
The Distraction Scenario
see the sand closing in on formerly produc-
If environmental security activities dis-
tive fields or hillsides laid bare by deforesta-
tion and erosion."54
tract from the primary purpose of the mili-
tary--defense--to the extent that the ability
How likely is it that accurate data would
to accomplish the latter mission is compro-
be available to environmentalists if those
11