Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Rights to discov-
extensively regulated to control catch rates)
separate or repackage tracts and rights in
they pleased. Regular stock dividends or
response to changing information and eco-
ered oil and gas in
adjustments in the exchange rate between
nomic conditions.
petroleum reser-
deeds to fish and fish consumed could be
Third, the expropriation of squatters'
voirs could be
used to compensate for growth in the fish
rights already recognized by the government
stock or variations due to other factors.
(for example, outstanding BLM grazing per-
assigned in the
Similarly, rights to discovered oil and gas
mits) is avoided by deed assignment to those
form of freely
in petroleum reservoirs could be assigned in
individuals. This aspect of the plan would
the form of freely marketable and transfer-
discourage opposition to divestiture from
marketable and
able deeds based on the estimated size and
individuals who rightly feel they have some
transferable deeds
extent of the reservoir stock.6 6 The owner of
real economic stake in the present system.
based on the esti-
the oil and gas rights on a tract of land with a
Fourth, the bidding mechanism provides
proven well need not drill additional wells to
an incentive for combination bids to express
mated size and
exercise the right to oil and gas. Instead, the
maximum willingness to pay, by guarantee-
extent of the
owner might sell his oil deed certificates to
ing that except in rare cases (for example, tied
reservoir stock.
the owner of an adjoining tract on which
bids) the winning bidders will pay prices that
drilling may be less costly or to a neighbor
are less than the amounts bid. The effect is to
who has already drilled an efficient number
maximize allocative efficiency.
of producing wells. The idea is to create a
Fifth, the proposal provides opportunities
property rights system in which the value of
and incentives for environmentalists and
oil reservoir stocks can be captured without
their organizations to participate directly in
producing oil for the market. In this way the
the ownership and management of amenity
decision to drill wells or to produce from
resources by bidding for the surface rights to
existing wells can be based on the profitabili-
park and wilderness lands. Present federal
ty of those activities rather than on a concern
laws that restrict certain parcels of land to
that others will capture any oil that is not
specified economic uses (such as timber har-
recovered.
vesting or mining) would be abolished.
Finally, in the case of certain common
pool resources such as ground water and
Conclusion
fisheries, we propose that the appropriate
governmental unit issue deeded certificate
The divestiture proposal in this paper is  rights to unrecovered ground water and to
characterized by the following principal fea-  live fish by species. These transferable and
tures. First, it is fair in the sense that all citi-  marketable certificates would then be surren-
zens would share equally in the value of the  dered in payment for extracted water or for
628 million acres of federal land that would  landed fish. Equality between the stock of
be capitalized into the market price of land  outstanding certificate claims and the esti-
share certificates, and all would benefit from mated stock of the resource could be main-
the productive opportunities created by  tained by periodic adjustment of the surren-
der terms of certificates to reflect updated
divestiture.
Second, elementary property rights are  estimates of the resource stock. This proce-
defined by deeds to the various functional  dure, in effect, creates exclusive marketable
uses of unit tracts of land. The size of owner-  property rights in common property
ship parcels and the manner in which use  resources, which allows the natural scarcity
rights to the land were combined into pack-  of such resources to determine their prices
ages of ownership rights would be deter-  and thereby discipline the individual owner's
mined by the market in the primary auction  decision to extract the resource.
Many individuals and groups may oppose
by a combinatorial sealed-bid mechanism,
and subsequently by exchanges that could  the divestiture of public lands because they
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