Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 20
In sum, we think it untenable to conclude that there are no judicially enforceable
limitations on presidential actions, besides actions that run afoul of the Constitution or
which contravene direct statutory prohibitions, so long as the President claims that he is
acting pursuant to the Procurement Act in the pursuit of governmental savings. Yet this is what
the government would have us do. Its position would permit the President to bypass scores of
statutory limitations on governmental authority, and we therefore reject it. [Ibid. at 1332.]
It does not seem to us possible to deny that the President's Executive Order seeks to set a
broad policy governing the behavior of thousands of American companies and affecting millions
of American workers. The President has, of course, acted to set procurement policy rather than
labor policy. But the former is quite explicitly based--and would have to be based--on his views
of the latter. For the premise of the Executive Order is the proposition that the permanent
replacement of strikers unduly prolongs and widens strikes and disrupts the proper "balance"
between employers and employees. Whether that proposition is correct, or whether the prospect
of permanent replacements deters strikes, and therefore an employer's right to permanently
replace strikers is simply one element in the relative bargaining power of management and
organized labor, is beside the point. Whatever one's views on the issue, it surely goes to the heart
of United States labor relations policy. [Ibid. at 1337.]
No state or federal official or government entity can alter the delicate balance of bargaining and
economic power that the NLRA establishes, whatever his or its purpose may be.