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bring a non-statutory cause of action questioning the legality of the Executive Order. [Ibid. at
132627.]
The message of this line of cases is clear enough: courts will "ordinarily presume that Congress
intends the executive to obey its statutory commands and, accordingly, that it expects the courts
to grant relief when an executive agency violates such a command." Bowen v. Michigan Academy
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681, 90 L. Ed. 2d 623, 106 S. Ct. 2133 (1986). [Ibid. at
1328.]
Since "the [Secretary of Labor's] powers are [allegedly] limited by [the NLRA], his actions
beyond those limitations [viz., enforcing the Executive Order] are considered individual and not
sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do . . ." Larson, 337 U.S. at 689. So, there is no sovereign immunity to waive--it never
attached in the first place.
Although the government's brief advanced a breathtakingly broad claim of non-
reviewability of presidential actions, the government does not seriously press its argument that
we may not exercise jurisdiction over appellants' claim because they lack a cause of action or
cannot point to a waiver of sovereign immunity. At oral argument counsel relied instead on
the more limited notion, also advanced in the brief, that the Procurement Act delegated
wide discretion to the President and we were not authorized to review his exercise of that
discretion so long as he did not violate a direct prohibition of another statute (or the
Constitution). [Ibid. at 1329, parentheses in original.]