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property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed

from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not understand the Government to

rely on statutory authorization for this seizure. There are two statutes which do authorize the

President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions. However, the

Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President's order was not

rooted in either of the statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these

statutes (' 201 [b] of the Defense Production Act) as "much too cumbersome, involved, and time-

consuming for the crisis which was at hand."

Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent

work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this

controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes. When the

Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which

would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Apparently it was

thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the

process of collective bargaining. Consequently, the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not

provide for seizure under any circumstances. [Ibid. at 585­86.]

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in

some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language

grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied

from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on

provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .";