welcomed, and HCR 30 has helped focus
or statutory provision that empowers the
attention on the problem. But even if passed,
president to take the action embodied in the
the resolution would not remedy the prob-
directive, failing which the directive is deemed
lem--and could even divert attention from a
invalid. In addition, the application and legal
real solution.
effect of any directive that does cite such
Since HCR 30 has been introduced as a
authority are limited to the executive branch
concurrent resolution, its passage would not
unless the cited authority does in fact autho-
have the force of law. Concurrent resolutions
rize the embodied action. And, HR 2655
are not presented to the president for signa-
would establish, for the first time, a statutory
ture; they represent the sense of Congress
definition of a presidential directive.
only. They "are to be used for such purposes
Finally, recognizing that federal courts
as to correct the enrollment of bills and joint
have severely limited standing to challenge
resolutions, to create joint committees, to
presidential directives, the bill would grant
print documents, hearings, and reports, and
standing (1) to members of Congress if the
so forth."1 5 7
directive infringes on congressional power,
exceeds a congressional grant of power, or
Another concern with HCR 30 is that the
fails to state any authority; (2) to state and
purported limitation on expenditures is not
local officials if the directive infringes on
self-enforcing. The president can easily assert
their legitimate powers; and (3) to "any per-
that the "purpose" of any given executive order
son aggrieved in a liberty or property interest
is harmonious with prior appropriations.
adversely affected directly by the challenged
Finally, HCR 30 could be easily evaded.
Presidential order."
There are many types of presidential direc-
Solving the problem of presidential law-
tives; HCR 30 applies to only one: executive
making by statute will doubtless require
orders. Or, in the alternative, if HCR 30 is
overriding a presidential veto; but if that can
intended to affect all presidential directives,
be done, the result will be more sure and last-
the resolution fails to adequately define the
ing than any attempt by concurrent resolu-
object of its regulation. An effective remedy
tion. Such a statute would provide a powerful
must address the great creativity presidents
weapon for members of Congress and others
have demonstrated in imposing their policies
Powers were sepa-
to wield to defend their authority and their
on the country without benefit of constitu-
rated not to make
rights under the Constitution, even if the
tional or statutory authority.
courts must ultimately give force to the
HR 2655. Given those limitations, a more
government more
restraints the statute spells out. If our system
conventional legislative measure has just
efficient but to
of constitutional checks on power is to be
been introduced under the sponsorship of
restrain the nat-
preserved, Congress cannot, for the sake of
Representatives Paul and Metcalf, HR 2655,
expediency or efficiency, continue to ignore,
the Separation of Powers Restoration Act.
ural bent of men,
much less assist, presidential efforts to cir-
Following the approach taken by Congress in
even presidents,
cumvent those checks. Powers were separated
1976 in the National Emergencies Act, HR
not to make government more efficient but
2655 would eliminate the powers of the pres-
to act as tyrants.
to restrain the natural bent of men, even pres-
ident and his subordinates that are derived
idents, to act as tyrants.
from currently existing declarations by termi-
nating all such declarations. Further, under
HR 2655 the authority to declare national
Conclusion
emergencies would be vested exclusively in
Congress, making it impossible for one per-
son, by the mere stroke of a pen, to plunge
St. George Tucker, a prominent early
the nation into a state of emergency.
American jurist, understood well the point at
HR 2655 also requires that all presidential
issue in both the division and the separation
directives identify the specific constitutional
of powers:
21