Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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When a system of
cess is defined by growth in size and scope. Is
Introduction
it any wonder that at this point in the 20th
checks on power--
century, which has been dominated by the
pitting power
idea of "good government," the president of
There can be no liberty where the
against power--
the United States is seen more as the chief
legislative and executive powers are
executive of America, Inc., than as a person
united in the same person, or body of
ceases to function
charged primarily with the limited duty of
magistrates.
in an adversarial
seeing "that the Laws be faithfully executed"?
--Montesquieu
Nowhere is that transformation more
way and functions
When America's Founders gathered to  clear, perhaps, than in the growth of presi-
instead "coopera-
draft a new constitution for the nation, they  dential lawmaking, which is an obvious
tively"--with each
were especially mindful, from long study and  usurpation of both the powers delegated to
recent experience, of the need to check govern-  the legislative branch and those reserved to
unit working
mental power if the rights and liberties of the  the states. To warn against that prospect,
hand in hand
people were to be secured--which the  James Madison, in Federalist 47, quoted
Declaration of Independence had made clear  Montesquieu on the peril of uniting in the
with the others--
was the purpose of government. Thus, they  same person legislative and executive powers.
government nec-
instituted a plan that divided powers between  Yet, all too often in the modern era that con-
essarily grows.
the federal and the state governments, leaving  flation of powers has occurred--and the loss
most powers with the states and the people, as  of liberty, against which Montesquieu
the Tenth Amendment would soon make  warned, has followed.
A few examples from the current adminis-
explicit. And they separated the powers dele-
gated to the federal government among three  tration will serve initially to illustrate the
distinct branches, defined essentially by their  problem and should serve as well to show
how our liberties are at risk as long as
functions--legislative, executive, and judicial.
The basic Madisonian idea was that power  Congress, the courts, and the states fail to
would check power. The states would check  exercise their constitutional responsibilities
abuses of federal power and the federal gov-  to check the growth of presidential power.
ernment would check abuses of state power.  We will then trace the theory and history of
Similarly, because the three branches of the  the problem in order to show that there are
federal government were defined and  constitutional restraints on presidential
empowered with reference to their respective  power available to those charged with assert-
functions, each branch would check efforts  ing them, if only they would do so. We will
by the other branches to enlarge or abuse  next show that, almost from the beginning,
but especially in our own century, those
their powers.
Not surprisingly, that system of checks  restraints have not been used. Finally, we will
and balances works to limit government only  look at two cases in which the courts did
insofar as each unit in the system under-  limit presidential attempts to rule through
stands its responsibilities and carries them executive order or national emergency and
out. When a system of checks on power--pit-  two efforts currently before Congress that are
ting power against power--ceases to function  aimed at doing the same.
in an adversarial way and functions instead
"cooperatively"--with each unit working
hand in hand with the others, pursuing  President William Jefferson
"good government" solutions to human
Clinton
"problems"--government necessarily grows.
Since there is no end to the problems govern-
In December 1998, Rep. Ileana Ros-
ment thus transformed might address, gov-  Lehtinen (R-Fla.) rose on the floor of the
ernment becomes like a business, where suc-  House to observe that
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