Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
20, 1999. See also "Defining NATO's Aims," The
picture of the alliance's enlargement. The same
Economist, April 24, 1999, pp. 15­16.
strategic mindset that led to intervention in
Kosovo also underlies NATO's recent enlarge-
29. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Kosovo Now
ment, which resulted in the membership of
Bellwether As Well As Battlefield," New York Times,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Almost
April 25, 1999, p. A12.
certainly, NATO will continue to expand, and each
time it does, it will create a new unstable periphery
30. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
that demands further expansion. For some lead-
Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
ing American grand strategists, the continual
enlargement of NATO, and perforce of U.S. power,
31. On America's counterhegemonic strategy
is the objective. For example, former national secu-
toward Europe, see Christopher Layne, "From
rity adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski advocates unceas-
Preponderance toward Offshore Balancing:
ingly enlarging NATO by expanding to the east.
America's Future Grand Strategy," in America's
For him, today's alliance is simply the precursor to
Strategic Choices, ed. Michael E. Brown et al.
what will eventually become an American-domi-
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 244­82;
nated Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS). See
and John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard:
America's Continental Commitment," in No End
American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe,
(New York: Basic Books, 1997).
ed. Geir Lundestad (London: Macmillan, 1998),
pp. 221­45.
25. For recent studies arguing that the historical
record does not support the claim that the
32. Interview with Secretary of State Madeleine K.
United States must fight on the peripheries to
Albright, CNN's Larry King Live, March 23, 1999,
establish its resolve to defend vital core strategic
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/
interests, see Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions:
1999/990323.html.
Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in
the Third World, 1965­1990 (Ann  Arbor:
33. Richard Lugar, Remarks to the Atlantic
University of Michigan Press, 1994); and
Council's Board of Directors, University Club,
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International
Washington, December 1993.
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1996). See also Johnson.
34. As the late foreign policy scholar Robert
Osgood demonstrated, American intervention in
26. See Christopher Layne and Benjamin
World War I was not driven by any tangible threat
Schwarz, "American Hegemony--Without an
to American security interests. Robert E. Osgood,
Enemy," Foreign Policy 72, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 5­23.
Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations:
The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century
27. Even during the hiatus in the Rambouillet
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
talks, in early March 1999, Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott stated that, with the alliance
35. In the late 1940s, some leading U.S. policy-
about to observe its 50th anniversary at a
makers recognized that NATO and the Marshall
Washington, D.C., summit, Kosovo was a crucial
Plan might have the paradoxical effect of retard-
test of NATO's relevance in post­Cold War
ing rather than facilitating both West European
Europe. Anticipating the resumption of the
integration and Western Europe's reemergence as
Rambouillet conference, Talbott declared, "If the
an independent center of power in international
talks and their aftermath go badly, it will cast a
politics. George F. Kennan, head of the State
pall over the Washington Summit but, much
Department's policy planning staff, predicted
more important, over the Allies' . . . ability to ful-
that NATO would "come to overshadow, and
fill the objectives that they will set for themselves
probably replace, any development in the direc-
at the Summit." Strobe Talbott, "A New NATO
tion of European Union" as Western Europe
for a New Era," Address at the Royal United
became habituated to U.S. leadership in political
Services Institute, London, U.K., March 10, 1999,
and military affairs. Quoted in John Lewis
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999
Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford
/990310_talbott_nato.html.
University Press, 1987), p. 63.
John Foster Dulles, then a leading Republican
28. Clinton, Speech, March 24, 1999. Similarly,
foreign policy spokesman, observed in 1949 that
Secretary Albright stated that "Belgrade's actions
over time it might come to be seen that "the
constitute a critical test of NATO, whose strength
Economic Recovery Act [the Marshall Plan] and
and credibility have defended freedom and en-
the Atlantic Alliance Pact [NATO] were the two
sured our security for five decades." Madeleine K.
things which prevented a unity in Europe which
Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign
in the long run might have been more valuable
Relations Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., April
14