Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Montenegro's democratic, anti-Milosevic
isolate Serbia as long as Milosevic remains
government pursued a policy of benevolent
in power. Whatever the moral rationale for
neutrality toward NATO. Consequently,
that policy, its practical effect will be to
there is a real possibility that Belgrade may
undermine the goal of developing the
intervene, through the overt use of force or
Balkans economically. Politically and eco-
by covert destabilization, to overthrow
nomically, Serbia is the region's most
Montenegro's government. NATO has
important power. Without Serbia's partici-
warned Belgrade to keep its hands off
pation, any plan to revive the economy of
Montenegro.4 9 Whether that warning will be
the Balkans will fail. To give just two exam
-
challenged by the Serbs remains to be seen.
ples: Serbia's economic rehabilitation is
Finally, the Clinton administration has
vital to Macedonia (Serbia is Macedonia's
made it clear that it wants Milosevic removed
major trading partner) and the economies of
from power in Belgrade. Whatever one thinks
those states both upstream and downstream
of Milosevic (and few can think well of him),
from Serbia have been severely affected by
a U.S. policy that seeks to cause a change of
the interruption of commerce on the
regime in Belgrade may open a political
Danube (NATO destroyed a number of
Pandora's box. If there is political upheaval in
Yugoslavia's Danube bridges, thereby
The war over
Serbia, it is far from clear that pro-Western
blocking the waterway).
Kosovo will has-
democratic forces will come to power (much
less be able to retain power). It is also possible
ten the formation
Wider Ramifications
that a change of regime could bring to power
of countervailing
political elements even more nationalistic
coalitions to rein
than Milosevic. Given that many Serbs may
Finally, the war with Yugoslavia has had
harbor hopes of revenge for the recent con-
important geopolitical effects that reverber-
in what other
flict, such an extreme situation is a worri-
ate far beyond the Balkans. Clinton's Kosovo
nations see as a
some possibility.
policy has had portentous consequences for
Even if none of those pessimistic scenarios
America's relations with its great-power
too powerful
comes to pass, the United States and Western
rivals, Russia and China, and its great-power
America.
Europe are going to spend a great deal of
allies, the West European nations. Friend and
money attempting to rebuild the Balkans in
foe alike have been treated to a demonstra-
the hope of purchasing political stability in
tion of America's power, which is bound to
make them nervous.5 2 The war over Kosovo
the region. The European Union has pledged
to spend $500 million a year rebuilding
will hasten the formation of countervailing
Kosovo during the next three years. The cost
coalitions to rein in what other nations see as
of rebuilding and stabilizing the region as a
a too powerful America. Washington's policy
whole (including Albania, Macedonia, and
in Kosovo, in fact, contains the seeds of U.S.
Montenegro) is estimated at $30 billion dur-
imperial decay.
ing the next five years.5 0
When one assesses the great burden the
United States has incurred as a result of
Although President Clinton has de-
fighting this war, President Clinton's claims
clared that Western Europe should shoul-
of "victory" ring hollow. If this is victory, we
der the bulk of the responsibility for the
must hope fervently that the United States is
Balkans' economic reconstruction, it seems
spared the consequences of a real defeat.
almost inevitable that the United States,
too, will end up contributing substantially
to that effort.51 Yet, even as the European
Notes
Union and the United States acknowledge
the need to rebuild the Balkans, any effort
1. William Jefferson Clinton, Speech to the
to do so is handicapped by the fact that
nation, March 24, 1999, http://www.pub.
Washington and Europe will continue to
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