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The KLA is likely

for the creation of a multiethnic democra-

Although the KLA forces will probably sur-

cy. The KLA is not committed to democra-

render their heavy weapons and take off their

to come to power

cy. As Chris Hedges, a reporter who spent

uniforms, they are not likely to give up their

in postwar

more than a year investigating the KLA,

small arms, assault rifles, and grenades.

Kosovo--it has

writes, the KLA has "little sympathy with or

Those weapons, the backbone of any insur-

understanding of democratic institu-

gent force, will be hidden from NATO peace-

already begun to

tions."4 4 The KLA is not committed to liv-

keepers. In addition, the KLA can, and almost

do so--and that is

certainly will, use Albania--which is beyond

ing side by side with ethnic Serbs in post-

NATO's peacekeeping jurisdiction--as a

war Kosovo. Already, in just the first weeks

not a good out-

training base and an armory.

of peace, the KLA has turned the tables and

come for the

The KLA is a guerrilla force, accustomed

Kosovo's Serbs have become the new vic-

Balkans, or for

to operating "underground." Thus, NATO's

tims of ethnic cleansing.

formal "demilitarization" of the KLA is

America and

The KLA's Agenda and Its Implications

unlikely to impair either its political or its

Western Europe.

military effectiveness. The KLA has also

The KLA's long-range political ambitions

made it clear that any peace settlement that

are in direct conflict with those of the United

fails to provide for Kosovo's independence is

States and NATO. Washington and the

"unacceptable."4 8 Given that the alliance has

alliance seek a postwar Kosovo that enjoys

substantial self-rule as an autonomous

no plans to grant independence to Kosovo,

province of Serbia. The KLA, however, is com-

NATO soon could find itself fighting a dif-

mitted to attaining independence for Kosovo

ferent war in Kosovo, a war in which NATO

and ultimately to forcibly uniting Kosovo

will have replaced the Serbs as the KLA's foe.

with Albania and the ethnic Albanian por-

That is reason enough to reconsider the wis-

tion of Macedonia. The latter objective would

dom of deploying American troops as peace-

almost certainly trigger a wider Balkan con-

keepers in Kosovo.

flict. As Hedges puts it, the KLA is "uncom-

By deciding to intervene in Kosovo's civil

promising in its quest for an independent

war, the United States created its own polit-

Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later."4 5If

ical version of "Frankenstein's monster" in

the Balkans. The KLA is likely to come to

the KLA succeeds in achieving its goal of

power in postwar Kosovo--it has already

independence for Kosovo, it will bode ill for

begun to do so--and that is not a good out-

Balkan stability--the ostensible goal of U.S.

come for the Balkans, or for America and

policy. Furthermore, the prospect of a radical

Western Europe.

Islamic state on the Continent is anathema

to the West European countries. Yet, para-

NATO's New Balkan Protectorates

doxically, that is the likely long-term conse-

The KLA is only part of the problem. To

quence of NATO's intervention in the

maintain peace in the region, U.S. and NATO

Kosovo conflict.

peacekeepers will have to remain in Kosovo

Although the United States and NATO

for years to come. Moreover, NATO has

now find themselves in an uneasy alliance

assumed new formal defense obligations

with the KLA, the KLA is profoundly dis-

with respect to Albania and Macedonia.

trustful of, and hostile to, the United States

Because of its own fragile ethnic balance,

and its West European allies. The organiza-

Macedonia remains especially prone to insta-

tion is "militant, nationalist, uncompromis-

ing, and deeply suspicious of all outsiders."4 6

bility (not least because the KLA seeks to

incorporate parts of Macedonia into the

The KLA is merely using NATO temporarily

"Greater Albania" it wants to create).

to advance its own political agenda. NATO's

NATO has also implicitly assumed re-

postwar plans for Kosovo call for the KLA to

sponsibility for the Yugoslav republic of

"demilitarize," but the KLA has made it clear

that it has no intention of fully disarming.4 7

Montenegro. During the conflict in Kosovo,

11