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reluctant to move decisively toward strategic

More worrisome for the United States and

self-sufficiency.

NATO is the rise of the KLA, which has

In the early 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower,

moved boldly to fill Kosovo's postwar politi-

then serving as NATO's first military

cal vacuum. Although NATO and the KLA

supreme commander, observed that, if 10

may reach a modus vivendi for the short

years hence U.S. troops were still in Europe,

term, the seeds for a new war in Kosovo have

NATO and the Marshall Plan would have

already been planted. As part of the postwar

failed.3 7In the broad sweep of history, the cel-

settlement, NATO is committed to uphold-

ing Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo, but

ebration of NATO's 50th anniversary marks

KLA leaders have made it perfectly plain that

the failure, not the success, of American poli-

they will accept nothing less than complete

cy. The time has come to complete America's

independence. Even after NATO's "victory,"

historic post-1945 project and, in an orderly

Kosovo remains a powder keg.

fashion, devolve the task of ensuring the

Continent's peace, stability, and prosperity to

Relations with the KLA

a stable and prosperous Western Europe.

Although American officials denied allega-

Having achieved its goals in Europe, America

tions that the United States was tacitly

should bring its forces home from "over

involved in arming and training the KLA,

there." In the absence of a hegemonic threat,

there were indications during the war that

U.S. security is no longer affected by

such involvement occurred.4 0 Moreover, evi-

parochial European quarrels. There is cer-

tainly no reason why U.S. soldiers should be

dence existed that American support for the

asked to die for Kosovo or future Kosovos.

KLA crossed from tacit to active during the lat-

ter stages of the war. President Clinton report-

edly even signed an order authorizing the

NATO's Pyrrhic Victory

Central Intelligence Agency to covertly train

KLA forces to conduct sabotage operations

against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.4 1 Also,

The fruits of NATO's "victory" over

Yugoslavia have a bitter taste: the United

NATO coordinated its stepped-up air attacks

in early June with a KLA ground offensive.4 2

States and NATO will be entangled in the

southern Balkans for years keeping the

Cooperating with the KLA seemingly

peace, resettling refugees, and undertaking

accords with the timeless logic of power poli-

postwar reconstruction. Those missions are

tics: that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

going to be expensive and dangerous. The

The flaw in that argument is its incorrect

Balkans--always volatile--now are even less

premise: the KLA, in fact, is on its own side,

In Kosovo itself

stable than they were before NATO com-

not America's or NATO's. Thus, in the case of

"peace" has

menced its war in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo

the KLA, the enemy of our enemy is (or soon

brought with it

itself "peace" has brought with it the usual

will become) our enemy, too. That situation

countercycle of revenge: now it is that

poses serious problems for NATO's postwar

the usual counter-

province's ethnic Serbs who are being

peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

cycle of revenge.

forced into exile by vengeful ethnic Albani-

It is difficult to see why the KLA has

ans. In an especially brutal incident, 14

come to be the "good guy" in the Kosovo

conflict.4 3 The KLA includes disparate and

Serbian framers harvesting their crops were

massacred in the village of Gracko in July.

unpleasant elements: radical Islamic funda-

By the seventh week of NATO's deploy-

mentalists, communists, drug traffickers,

ment, there had been 198 confirmed homi-

criminals, and the descendants of the eth-

cides, 573 arson attacks, and 840 cases of

nic Albanians who fought for the Nazis in

looting.3 8 According to Human Rights

World War II. The KLA's aims are inconsis-

tent with Washington's vision and NATO's

Watch, more than 164,000 Serb civilians

have been driven from Kosovo.3 9

vision for the province--a vision that calls

10