Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
something now to stop massacre [sic]
States into World War I for idealistic reasons,
and fighting before its spreads
notwithstanding that American strategic
beyond national boundaries.3 2
interests were not at issue.3 4 Postwar disillu-
sionment, both popular and elite, with
Wilson's crusade "to make the world safe for
As Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said several
democracy" had the backlash effect of causing
years ago, "If history teaches us anything, it is
the United States to take a hands-off posture
that the United States is always drawn into
toward European security affairs until 1940.
such European conflicts because our vital
interests are ultimately, albeit somewhat
belatedly, engaged."33 Although this line of
America's Commitment to Europe
Fosters Dependence
reasoning is repeatedly invoked by officials
Fifty years after NATO's founding, in the
and policy analysts, it is wrong as a matter of
wake of the alliance's first war, the time has
historical fact.
come to reassess America's continental com
-
The Stability Argument's Faulty
mitment. The original purposes of America's
Historical Assumptions
post­World War II policy in Europe have
been fulfilled in all respects save one: Western
Instability in its peripheries may affect
The Balkans--
Europe's remarkable recovery from the war's
Europe, but, contrary to the U.S. foreign pol-
always volatile--
ravages has not been matched by the emer-
icy establishment's conventional wisdom, it
gence of a strategically independent Western
has never been true that Europe's wars invari-
now are even less
Europe. Ironically, as some key American pol-
ably affect America's security interests. Most
stable than they
icymakers recognized at the end of World
of Europe's wars--even wars involving the
were before
War II, the U.S. commitment to postwar
great powers--have not affected American
Europe had the paradoxical effect of making
security. Moreover, the counterhegemonic
N A T O com-
Western Europe's rehabilitation possible
strategy much more accurately delineates the
menced its war in
and, at the same time, creating a dependency
requirements of America's European strategy
on America that has proved to be a major
than does the current strategy of reassurance
Yugoslavia.
impediment to Western Europe's political
and stabilization. The kinds of small-scale
unity and strategic self-sufficiency.35
conflicts that have occurred this decade in
the Balkans do not threaten America's securi-
Today, on both sides of the Atlantic, there
ty interests because such conflicts do not
is ambivalence about the future of the Euro-
raise the single strategic danger that Europe
Atlantic relationship. The United States, on
could pose to the United States: the emer-
the one hand, fears West European unity and
gence of a continental hegemon. Thus, the
the consequent loss of hegemonic control that
"new" NATO represents a radical transfor-
such unity would entail. The Europeans, on
mation of the alliance's strategic mission--
the other hand, fear taking the last--and most
and of America's role in NATO.
difficult--steps to unity and independence.
Since the United States achieved indepen-
They also fear losing the security of being an
dence, there have been 10 great-power wars in
American protectorate (which nevertheless
Europe--namely, in 1792­1802, 1803­15,
remains a source of transatlantic friction).
1853­55, 1859­60, 1866, 1870, 1877­78,
Still, as Johns Hopkins University diplomatic
1912­13, 1914­18, and 1939­45. The United
historian John Lamberton Harper notes in his
States has been involved in only three of those
recent book American Visions of Europe, neither
wars; moreover, it could have safely remained
the Americans nor the Europeans see "the sta-
tus quo as either salutary or tenable."3 6
out of two of those three. In 1812, hoping to
conquer Canada while the British were preoc-
Washington can cut this Gordian knot; how-
cupied with the Napoleonic Wars, the United
ever, as long as the Europeans believe the
States initiated war with Britain. In 1917,
United States will assume the main responsi-
President Woodrow Wilson took the United
bility for the Continent's security, they will be
9