Instability in its
deterred by U.S. action against Iraq, Saddam
have feared the prospect of a single power's
dominating the European continent.3 1 In
Hussein was not deterred by U.S. action in
peripheries may
Panama; Manuel Antonio Noreiga was not
command of the Continent's resources, a
affect Europe,
deterred by U.S. actions in Lebanon,
European hegemon would be powerful
but, contrary to
Grenada, and Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh was not
enough to threaten America's security in
deterred by U.S. action against North Korea;
the Western Hemisphere. The counterhege-
the U.S. foreign
and Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin were not
monic strategy has allowed the United
policy establish-
deterred by U.S. action against Adolf Hitler.
States to stand aloof from involvement in
NATO's "victory" in Kosovo will not deter
European security affairs, because geogra-
ment's conven-
future crises. In those crises, the relative
phy has largely insulated the United States
tional wisdom, it
importance of the stakes to each side will
from the great-power rivalries in Europe
has never been
determine the "balance of resolve"--and the
and the European balance of power has
credibility of U.S. threats.
usually prevented any single state from
true that Europe's
dominating the Continent. However, in
wars invariably
1940, and again after World War II, the col-
Faulty Rationale Number
affect America's
lapse of the European balance of power
Three: Validating NATO
impelled the United States to intervene mil-
security interests.
itarily to forestall the looming hegemony
first of Nazi Germany and then of the
The final rationale for U.S. intervention
Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union's dis-
in Kosovo was the need to validate NATO's
appearance, the counterhegemonic ration-
importance in postCold War Europe. For
ale for U.S. military involvement in Europe
Washington, Kosovo became a test of
has ceased to carry weight.
NATO's relevance and credibility in the
post-Soviet world.2 7 President Clinton
From Counterhegemony to an Obsession
bluntly expressed that reasoning when he
with Stability
said on March 24 that to stand aside in
The collapse of Soviet power has com
-
Kosovo "would discredit NATO, the corner-
pelled U.S. policymakers to articulate a new
stone on which our security has rested for
50 years now."28 As one senior administra-
rationale for NATO and the American mili-
tary role in Europe. It is now contended that
tion official put it at NATO's 50th anniver-
the United States has a crucial interest in pre-
sary commemoration, Kosovo is "a meta-
venting any regional instability on the
phor for what the new NATO is supposed
to be all about."29 That logic, of course, begs
Continent because, so it is asserted, history
demonstrates that the United States is invari-
the key questions, questions that so far
ably drawn into Europe's wars. Secretary
have not been adequately debated in the
Albright has explicitly stated the connection
United States: A decade after the Cold
between Kosovo and this putative U.S. inter-
War's end, why is NATO still in business,
est in overall European stability:
and why is it that the American military
presence in Europe is still considered vital
I think that this is in the national
by U.S. policymakers? After all, the
interest of the United States because
alliance's survival beyond the Cold War is
we are so concerned about making
an anomaly: throughout history alliances
sure there is not instability in this
have typically dissolved after the common
threat to the allies' security has dissipated.3 0
part of Europe. We've learned, over
the 20th Century, that instability in
Europe and fighting and ethnic con-
America's Traditional European Strategy
flict has in fact brought American
Historically, "counterhegemonic" con-
soldiers in twice at great cost, and
cerns have shaped U.S. strategy toward
that we have an opportunity to do
Europe--that is, American policymakers
8