<<  <  >  >>

would automatically spread and endanger

more important U.S. interests in Western

peace and stability throughout Europe.

Europe led first to NATO military interven-

Distilled to its essence, the administration's

tion and then to the further extension of

argument was that it was necessary to fight a

NATO security guarantees to Albania and

Macedonia.2 4

European war (in Kosovo) now to avoid hav-

ing to fight a European war later.

It is that kind of strategic thinking that

explains why Washington believes it must

Foolish Commitments in Peripheral

demonstrate its leadership and resolve by

Regions

intervening in places that, in themselves,

Washington's obsessive concern with

have no strategic importance to the United

credibility, and with falling dominoes,

States. However, American policymakers

highlights a little-understood paradox at

have gotten it backward: precisely because

the core of U.S. foreign policy. Because of

these regions are not strategically conse-

geography, the formidable U.S. military,

quential, U.S. credibility is not at stake in

economic, and technological capabilities,

such peripheral areas as the Balkans. Credi-

and the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons,

bility is a function of the interests at stake

the United States today--as has been the

in a specific crisis. When America's intrinsic

case throughout the post­World War II

claims in a particular dispute are high (and

era--is more secure than any great power in

obvious), and America's military capabili-

history. Yet, both during the Cold War and

ties are robust, neither declared adversaries

since, the United States has repeatedly

nor others will question U.S. resolve. By the

found itself involved in conflicts in strategi-

same token, when the United States fails to

cally peripheral regions--ostensibly out of a

intervene in peripheral areas, others will not

need to maintain its credibility.22 Credibil-

draw adverse inferences about America's will-

ingness to defend vital core interests.2 5

ity is seen as important by U.S. policymak-

ers, who regard it as the key to America's

Another fallacy underlying Washing-

ability to impose order on the international

ton's obsession with credibility is the

political system.

assumption that global events are tightly

The pursuit of world order, however, is

interconnected and that what the United

taxing--even for the world's "sole remain-

States does in one crisis sets a precedent for

ing superpower." Because that ambition

subsequent crises. Hence, Clinton argued

requires the United States to impose order

that if Serbian "aggression" in suppressing

With the Soviet

on, and control over, the international sys-

an insurgency in Serbian territory went

Union's disap-

tem, the United States must continually

unpunished, leaders in other troubled

enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic

regions would be emboldened to take simi-

pearance, the

responsibilities in order to to maintain the

lar actions. But the fact that the United

counterhegemon-

security of its already-established interests.

States and NATO thwarted Serbia is no

The result is the continual expansion of

more likely to deter future aggressors than

ic rationale for

America's frontiers of insecurity into

U.S. action in the Persian Gulf--which, after

U.S. military

peripheral areas, such as the Balkans. As

all, was defended as part of George Bush's

involvement in

foreign policy scholar Robert H. Johnson

"new world order" that would punish

observes, this process becomes self-sustain-

aggressors--deterred Serbia.

Europe has

ing because each time America pushes its

In the world of statecraft, most crises are

ceased to carry

discrete, not tightly linked.2 6 The outcome of

security interests outward, threats to the

new security frontier will be perceived. That

events in other potential hot spots (Taiwan,

weight.

new uncertainty "leads to self-extension,

Korea, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Basin)

which leads in turn to new uncertainty and

will be decided by local conditions, not by

further self-extension."2 3 Fear that instabil-

what the United States does or does not do in

the Balkans. Just as Milosevic was not

ity in Kosovo would ripple back and affect

7