ton, and NATO headquarters in Brussels,
tators or aggressive leaders in coun-
engaged in a calculated campaign of "percep-
tries who felt their own space was not
tion management"--for example, continually
big enough and that they had to
expand it.1 8
treating uncorroborated rumors of Serbian
atrocities as established fact and hyperboli-
Washington's Shopworn Arguments
cally comparing Serbian actions in Kosovo to
the Holocaust. Of course, ethnic cleansing is
Those are the same arguments, almost
cruel and unjust, but it is not genocide. A mil-
verbatim, that American policymakers
itary counterinsurgency campaign that
employed throughout the Cold War.
appears to have resulted in fewer than 5,000
President Clinton's March 24 remarks were
deaths is not comparable to the Holocaust.
an eerie echo of President Harry S Truman's
To suggest otherwise is to engage in the rank-
1951 assertion that it is easier to put out a
est kind of war propaganda.
fire in the beginning when it is small than
Humanitarian concerns were not the
after it has become a roaring blaze. If history
reason the United States became involved
teaches us anything, it is that aggression any-
in Kosovo; rather, they were the "reason"
where in the world is a threat to peace every-
where in the world.1 9 The Clinton adminis-
that most successfully dampened public
When America's
and congressional opposition to the
tration's arguments for intervention in
intrinsic claims in
administration's policy.
Kosovo were evocative, as well, of the Johnson
administration's arguments for U.S. involve-
a particular dis-
ment in Vietnam.
pute are high
Faulty Rationale Number
There is a reason, of course, why policy-
Two: American Credibility
(and obvious),
makers repeatedly employ the metaphors of
spreading wildfires or falling dominoes.
and America's
Those metaphors are useful, perhaps even
The arguments that intervention in
military capabili-
indispensable, in rallying support for inter-
Kosovo was required to preserve U.S. "credi-
ventions in places that bear no intrinsic
bility" and to prevent the toppling of geopo-
ties are robust,
strategic relationship to America's security
litical dominoes in Europe are neither novel
neither declared
interests.2 0 Thus, U.S. policymakers did not
nor persuasive. The administration's line--
adversaries nor
which was based on a simplistic, and unhis-
claim that America had vital interests in
torical, interpretation of events in the
Vietnam. Instead, they argued that if the
others will ques-
1930s--goes like this: If aggression by "dicta-
United States failed to intervene in Vietnam,
tion U.S. resolve.
tors" is not quickly opposed, their appetites
worse things would happen later on and
will grow and they will have to be stopped
America's allies would lose faith in U.S. com
-
later, at greater cost. If the United States does
mitments everywhere. Former secretary of
not stop aggression when it first occurs, that
state Dean Rusk explained why he believed
aggression will inevitably spiral into a wider
that the United States needed to fight in
conflict. The structure of peace, thus, is said
Vietnam: "The lesson I learned from World
to be indivisible. In his March 24, 1999,
War II was that if aggression is allowed to
speech, President Clinton declared, "Let a fire
gather momentum, it can continue to build
burn in this area and the flames will spread."
and lead to general war. . . . If I thought there
Secretary Albright stated:
was no connection between the events in
Southeast Asia, the broad structure of world
Here we are in 1999, at the end of
peace, and the possibility of a third World
what historians agree has been the
War, I might have advised differently on
Vietnam."2 1
bloodiest century in the history of
the world. We know how the blood
The Clinton administration used the
was created and why it happened. It
same "logic" to justify intervention in
happened because there were evil dic-
Kosovo: if aggression were not halted there, it
6