The Kosovo war
the United States, along with its NATO allies,
Introduction
has assumed a commitment of indefinite
was eminently
duration to pacify and rebuild Kosovo; resettle
avoidable, but the
In diplomacy and politics, as in baseball, it
the ethnic Albanian refugees; and stabilize
United States,
is always better to be lucky than good.
Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro (in
President Bill Clinton was very lucky that his
addition to the preexisting commitment in
Western Europe,
ill-conceived war against Yugoslavia did not
Bosnia). By turning Kosovo into a de facto
and the peoples
culminate in an irreparable fiasco. The result
protectorate, the United States and the
to date is bad enough. Although the admin-
alliance risk becoming involved in another
of the Balkans
istration's spinmeisters are depicting
war--this time with the KLA, which is com
-
will be living with
Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's
mitted to attaining independence for Kosovo.
the consequences
acceptance of NATO's peace terms as a vindi-
The war against Yugoslavia may be over, but
cation of Clinton's Kosovo policy, "spin"
America's Balkan difficulties are far from over.
of that conflict
should not be confused with truth. The real-
How is it that the United States has
for years to come.
ity is that the administration stumbled into
become involved in this dubious enterprise?
war and blundered its way to "victory." If the
American policymakers invoked three basic
outcome in Kosovo can be called a victory
rationales to justify the war against Yugo-
at all, then we should bear in mind the
slavia: (1) preventing humanitarian disaster,
words uttered in the third century B.C. by
(2) preserving American credibility, and (3)
validating NATO's role in postCold War
King Pyrrhus of Epirus: "Another such victo-
Europe. All three are fundamentally flawed.
ry and we shall be undone."
The Kosovo war was eminently avoidable,
but the United States, Western Europe, and
Faulty Rationale Number
the peoples of the Balkans will be living with
One: Humanitarian
the consequences of that conflict for years to
Intervention
come. The Clinton administration was woe-
fully ignorant of the historical and political
context of events in Kosovo. After having
In his March 24, 1999, speech to the
absolved the Kosovo Liberation Army and
nation and subsequently, President Clinton
concluded that the Serbs alone were respon-
stressed the "moral imperative" to intervene
sible for the situation, the administration
in Kosovo because of the humanitarian
tragedy there.1 (That rationale was seemingly
intervened in a civil war over power and land
between the KLA and the Serbian govern-
lent new urgency by the May 28 decision of
ment. At Rambouillet, instead of exploring
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
the possibilities of a compromise settlement,
Former Yugoslavia to indict Milosevic for war
which is what real diplomacy is about, the
crimes in connection with atrocities commit-
administration presented Belgrade with an
ted by Serbian military and paramilitary
ultimatum: sign or be bombed. Although the
forces in Kosovo.) However, as a rationale for
administration indignantly denies the
the war, humanitarian intervention is doubly
charge, NATO bombing triggered the very
flawed. First, before the commencement of
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo that
the NATO bombing campaign, there was no
Washington said it was acting to prevent. As
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo; the Serbian
a result of the Clinton administration's poli-
drive to expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo
cy, hundreds of thousands of ethnic
began after the United States and NATO
Albanians were forced to flee Kosovo, and
launched the air strikes. Second, quite apart
hundreds were killed by NATO bombs (to say
from that salient fact, even on its own terms
nothing of the Serb civilians killed by NATO
the humanitarian rationale is an unconvinc-
bombing).
ing explanation for Washington's decision to
Moreover, Clinton's "victory" means that
intervene in this particular conflict.
2