Cato Institute
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Treasury for a portion of the "nonrecurring
that would have gone to the U.S. Treasury to
research and development costs" incurred by
reimburse the taxpayer funds that went into
the government for major systems like the
developing U.S. weapons systems.
F-16 fighter or the M-1 tank. The debate over
In 1996 the industry finally won congres-
recoupment fees is an example of how the
sional approval for a provision that would
arms industry has managed to win favorable
allow the president to waive recoupment fees
treatment for itself and its clients by misrep-
on any FMS sale, as long as provisions were
resenting the facts about government subsi-
made to find an alternative source of revenue
dies. As far back as November 1988, the
equivalent in value to the fees that were
industry-dominated Defense Policy Advisory
waived. The first installment of those alter-
Committee on Trade broached the subject of
native revenues was provided by William
pursuing changes in the prices of weapons
Cohen. Prior to assuming his current post as
exports that "would have reduced or elimi-
secretary of defense, Cohen was a pro-defense
nated research and development surchar-
senator from Maine who regularly went to
ges."25 The industry followed up that sugges-
bat for the interests of weapons makers in his
tion with a multiyear lobbying effort that
home state. Late one night in the summer of
convinced the Bush administration to elimi-
1996, Senator Cohen quietly slipped a provi-
nate the recoupment fees for R&D on com-
sion into a defense bill that authorized the
mercial arms sales, which involve sales of
Department of Defense to sell items from the
items on the U.S. munitions list that are
strategic stockpile, a Pentagon-administered
licensed for export by the U.S. Department of
reserve of critical raw materials that was
State. Commercial arms sales have been an
established during the Cold War, and to use
average of roughly 25 percent of U.S. arms
the proceeds to offset the costs of waiving
exports over the past decade.
recoupment fees on foreign arms sales.27
The arms industry also successfully
A recent GAO report demonstrated that
sought repeal of recoupment fees for arms
even when recoupment fees had not been
sales under the Pentagon's FMS program.
waived, the Pentagon had been remiss in col-
But since the fees on those deals were written
lecting them. The report identified $183 mil-
into law, it took longer to get them repealed.
lion in uncollected recoupment fees on FMS
Because the other 75 percent of U.S. arms
deals administered by the Air Force and the
sales are supplied through FMS channels,
Navy, including a case involving the delivery
repealing recoupment fees on FMS sales was
of 48 F-16 aircraft to South Korea for which
a particularly lucrative accomplishment.26
no fees were collected.28
Three-quarters
In FMS deals the Pentagon acts as a bro-
The cumulative result of waiving (or failing
ker (in commercial sales, the supplier sells to
to collect) recoupment fees has been a loss to
of the federal
the buyer without a broker). The Pentagon's
the U.S. Treasury of hundreds of millions of
government's
responsibilities in an FMS deal include nego-
dollars per year. And even those arms deals for
tiating the terms of the deal with the foreign
which forgone recoupment fees were "offset"--
R&D budget is
client, collecting funds from the foreign
by selling off materials from the strategic
devoted to mili-
client, disbursing them to U.S. contractors as
stockpile--represented a transfer of wealth
tary projects. The
the work proceeds, and supplying logistics
from the taxpayers to particular companies.
and spare parts for the weapons system.
Because arms manufacturers are rarely asked
bulk of those
As a first step toward eliminating the
to open their books to public scrutiny, there is
funds goes to pri-
charges on FMS deals, the arms industry was
no way of knowing for sure whether those
vate contractors.
successful in obtaining a provision that
reduced fees have resulted in lower prices for
allowed the president to waive recoupment fees
the buyers of U.S. arms or higher profits for
on FMS sales to close allies--NATO members,
U.S. weapons exporters. What is clear is that
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. From 1991
those fee reductions were not needed to "level
to 1994, over $773 million was waived in fees
the playing field" for U.S. manufacturers. New
10