Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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The experience of
in Russia will have trustworthy banks in
Russia lacks an efficient payments system
which to keep funds for payrolls, payments
because the government prevents private
Russia has been
to suppliers, and so on. Banks will have avail-
entrepreneurs from creating one.
that central bank-
able a substantial pool of savings to lend for
Why has the Russian government erected
ing has created
productive use. Resources will cease being
so many barriers to monetary reform? After
channeled to unprofitable enterprises
all, the government would ultimately benefit
far more shocks
through loans from the central bank and will
from dollarization. If it could regain access to
than it has
instead find profitable employment in a vari-
credit markets, it could replace the high-
absorbed.
ety of new industries. The transition to a
interest ruble debt that led to the financial
more productive economy will be difficult,
crisis with comparatively low-interest dollar
but, as described below, the experience of
debt. The economic growth that dollariza-
some other former socialist countries sug-
tion would encourage would also help the
gests that respectable economic growth can
government more easily meet its targets for
begin quickly.
tax collection.
The Central Bank of Russia, if it still
There are two reasons for the govern-
exists, will not be a lender of last resort to the
ment's behavior. First, the government is
dollarized banking system because it cannot
unwilling to resist pressure from interest
print dollars. Since the main justification
groups that benefit from subsidies and from
given for central banks today is that commer-
the monetary system that administers the
cial banks need them as lenders of last resort,
subsidies. Eliminating the central bank
it may seem that a dollarized banking system
would solve much of the problem by elimi-
would be unstable. Experience indicates that
nating a channel for subsidies that is not
the opposite is true. Many, if not all, foreign
transparent and not well understood by the
banks that enter the Russian market will be
public. Second, government officials have
globally diversified firms that can draw on
misplaced national pride in the ruble. They
substantial foreign reserves to protect them-
believe that Russia cannot be a world power
selves from local shocks. In August, when
unless it has a distinct currency, issued by a
Russian banks defaulted, foreign banks car-
Russian central bank and used by a banking
ried on thanks to refinancing by their large,
system that is owned mainly by Russians.
globally diversified parent companies. A dol-
Although dollarization may be a sensitive
larized banking system with extensive foreign
issue for political reasons, the Russian gov-
participation will be much less vulnerable to
ernment and its foreign providers of finan-
systemwide failure than is the current ruble-
cial support have failed to recognize that the
based system dominated by home-grown
case for free trade in currencies is as strong as
banks. Indeed, lack of a lender of last resort in
the case for free trade in bananas or automo-
Russia will encourage all banks to adopt con-
biles. Nobody would insist that Russia grow
servative lending practices that reduce the
its own bananas or that Guatemala produce
likelihood of failures.
its own automobiles. Each country is better
off producing the things it makes most effi-
ciently and trading for the things it makes
The Ruble and
less efficiently than other countries. It so
happens that Russia has long been and
National Pride
remains an inefficient producer of monetary
policy, owing to the socialist elements that
Russians are unable to take full advantage
still exist in its monetary system. Russia
of a perfectly good money, the dollar, because
would be better off ceasing to produce mon-
their government demands that they use a
etary policy at home and instead importing it
bad money, the ruble; Russia has a bankrupt
from the United States (or from Western
banking system because the government
Europe or Japan, to the extent Russians want
restricts competition from foreign banks; and
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