priately named Mischief Reef has generated sharp
and North Korea," in North Korea after Kim Il Sung,
criticism from the Philippines, whose exclusive eco-
ed. Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (Boulder,
nomic zone contains the islands. Manila has so far
Colo.: Lynne Reiner, 1998), pp. 12345.
unsuccessfully called upon ASEAN and the United
66. Bandow, Tripwire, pp. 16263. A new report
Nations to intervene in the dispute. Philippine
from the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National
defense secretary Orlando Mercado has also point-
Security, the South Korean Foreign Ministry's
ed to his nation's mutual defense treaty with the
think tank, advocates that Washington perma-
United States and argued that it is in the interest of
nently station 5,000 soldiers on the peninsula in
America and allied states "that this particular area
order to, according to the Korea Times, "guarantee
be kept free as a sea-lane from the dominant con-
its automatic involvement in a regional conflict."
trol of one power." Quoted in Michael Richardson,
"U.S. Troop Presence Depends on Role in
"Philippines Is Stymied in Dispute with China,"
Unification: Report."
International Herald Tribune, January 21, 1999, p. 4.
Washington has so far, appropriately, remained
67. Security Strategy 1998, p. 62.
aloof.
68. Ibid., p. 20.
76. Security Strategy 1998, p. 36.
69. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Washington's
77. Ibid., p. 30.
Smothering Strategy: American Interests in East
78. Ibid., p. 65.
Asia," World Policy Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter
199798): 22.
79. For a general view, see Ted Galen Carpenter,
70. Security Strategy 1998, p. 21. Fear of North Korea
"Managing a Great Power Relationship: The
has grown since the North's recent missile launch,
United States, China and East Asian Security,"
causing a new debate over Japan's defense policy.
Journal of Strategic Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1998):
"The Call to Arms," The Economist, February
120.
27March 5, 1999, pp. 2325; and Michiyo
80. See generally Carpenter, "Let Taiwan Defend
Nakamoto, "LDP Debates Military Strikes
Itself."
Strategy," Financial Times, February 26, 1999, p. 4.
71. Bandow, "Okinawa."
81. See, for example, ibid., pp. 34.
72. Quoted in Kenneth Pyle, "The Japanese
82. In fact, the administration's policy of "strategic
Question," in Japan and the World: Considerations for
ambiguity" is extraordinarily irresponsible.
U.S. Policymakers (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian
Washington seems to be saying that the United
and Soviet Research, 1990), p. 7.
States might be willing to go war to protect
Taiwan, but who knows? The administration obvi-
73. See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter,
ously hopes it can deter China on the cheap, with-
"Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.Japanese
out having to actually threaten to use force.
Security Relationship," Cato Institute Policy
However, this course risks a repeat of Sir Edward
Analysis no. 244, November 1, 1995, pp. 2023; and
Grey's disastrous diplomacy on the eve of World
Frank Ching, "A Partnership under Strain," Far
War I. Britain's foreign secretary secretly commit-
Eastern Economic Review, March 17, 1994, p. 33. The
ted his nation to assist France without warning
media in both nations play a role. Stanley Budner
Germany of London's position, thereby making
and Ellis Krauss, "Newspaper Coverage of
both continental powers more willing to risk war.
U.S.Japan Frictions," Asian Survey 35, no. 4 (April
83. Today a Chinese invasion would be an extraor-
1995): 33656.
dinarily risky affair. U.S. Department of Defense,
74. See, for example, Doug Bandow, "ANZUS: A
"The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,"
Case of Strategy Obsolescence," in Collective Security
Report to Congress pursuant to FY99 appropria-
or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies for the
tions bill, 1999.
Future, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Lexington, Mass.:
84. See, for example, Martin Sieff, "Passage to
Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 12132; and Ted
India," National Review, June 22, 1998.
Galen Carpenter, "Pursuing a Strategic Divorce:
The U.S. and the ANZUS Alliance," Cato Institute
85. The Philippines undertook a serious military
Policy Analysis no. 67, February 27, 1986.
modernization program only after the United
75. The latter are claimed in whole or in part by
States departed, when it became impossible for
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan,
Manila to continue relying on Washington for its
and Vietnam. Chinese construction on the appro-
defense. Tony Tassell, "Spratly Nerves Force Manila
19