Notes
when America neglects the problems of the
world, the world often brings its problems to
1. U.S. Department of Defense, United States
America's doorstep."91 Yet no one seriously
Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region
(Washington: U.S. Department of Defense,
argues for isolation, or acting, in Cohen's
February 1995), p. 6.
words, "as if we could zip ourselves into a con-
tinental cocoon and watch events unfold on
2. U.S. Department of Defense, The United States
CNN."92 The real debate is between those who
Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region: 1998
(Washington: U.S. Department of Defense,
would be meddlers of first resort and those
November 1998). Cited hereafter as Security Strategy
who would be intervenors of last resort. Most
1998.
world problems will never end up on
America's doorstep unless Washington invites
3. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has helped fill any potential vac-
them to. Real leadership entails identifying the
uum that could have resulted from the eclipse of
rare problems that are likely to affect the
U.S. dominance in Southeast Asia two decades ago,
United States and then developing the most
and the Clinton administration extols the "increas-
effective response. With regard to the rest,
ingly important role" played by the organization,
Washington ought to rely on local leadership
whose members "have grown more confident and
assertive in the years following the end of the Cold
to deal with local problems.
War." Nevertheless, explains DOD, the ASEAN
Nowhere is that strategy more important
states support "a continued U.S. military presence
and desirable than in East Asia. The United
in the region." As a result, America "will remain
States will be more secure if friendly East Asian
committed to our friends and partners in
Southeast Asia both in good times and in bad."
powers, instead of relying on America, are able
Security Strategy 1998, pp. 3536. Of course, it is hard
and willing to contain nearby conflicts.
to find any nation that doesn't prefer to have
Moreover, as economic issues grow in impor-
America defend it. States the Pentagon, "Brunei
tance, it will become even more essential for
has publicly supported the U.S. role in maintaining
Asia-Pacific security, including a continued U.S.
Washington to simultaneously reduce the mil-
military presence in the region." Ibid., p. 37.
itary burden on the American economy and
ensure that its trading competitors bear the
4. Ibid., p. 7.
full cost of their own defense. Otherwise, U.S.
5. William Cohen, "America--Confronting the
firms will be less able to take advantage of
Issues and Staying the Course," World Affairs Journal
expanding regional and global economic
12, no. 1 (September 1998): 1.
opportunities.
Jettisoning antiquated alliances and com-
6. Security Strategy 1998, p. 1.
mitments and reducing a bloated force struc-
7. Ibid., p. 26.
Real leadership
ture do not mean the United States would
cease to be an Asian-Pacific power.93 After
8. Ibid., p. 63.
entails identifying
bringing its forces home from South Korea
the rare problems
9. Quoted in ibid., p. 26.
and Japan, America should center a reduced
defense presence around Wake Island, Guam,
that are likely to
10. Ibid., p. 38.
and Hawaii. The United States would remain
affect the United
11. Ibid., pp. 31, 34.
the globe's strongest military power (by far),
States and then
with the ability to intervene in East Asia if nec-
12. Ibid., p. 19.
essary. However, American policy would be
developing the
dictated by America's interests, rather than
13. Quoted in Mary Jordan, "Albright Assures
most effective
Japan That Alliance Is Strong," Washington Post, July
those of the populous and prosperous securi-
5, 1998, p. A12.
ty dependents that Washington has accumu-
response.
lated throughout the region. The Pentagon's
14. Security Strategy 1998, pp. 1920.
next East Asia security strategy report--and,
15. Ibid., p. 6.
more important, its practical policies--needs
to be based on that crucial principle.
16