ruptions is not only long; it is also so compli-
by states friendly to America--today, at least,
cated that an American military presence
only China seems a plausible, though not
would likely be unable to interrupt it. True,
likely, villain--Washington should be pre-
DOD does claim that U.S. troops allow
pared to act. But there is no reason to assume
Washington "to anticipate problems, man-
that Beijing will be an enemy. China's future
age potential threats and encourage peaceful
development is highly uncertain, and there is
resolution of disputes."86 But no successful
a great difference between an assertive
examples come to mind.
nation, which China has been so far, and an
America's economic strength, diplomatic
aggressive one.88 The PRC is a long way from
reach, and cultural ubiquity will always make
becoming such a threat in any case. Even
it a potential honest broker. Irrespective of
today Taiwan's GDP is about a third that of
Washington's views, states such as South
Beijing's, South Korea's economy is almost
Korea and Japan have good reason not to let
half as large as that of the PRC, and Japan's
disputes, such as that over the
GDP is more than four times as big as that of
Tokdu/Takeshima islands, escalate; in fact,
the PRC.89
reliance on U.S. defense guarantees encour-
Moreover, China is far more likely to
ages bilateral irresponsibility, since both
behave in a restrained fashion if its neighbors
The United States
nations can score domestic political points
possess serious deterrent capabilities. Beijing
should act as the
with little security risk. Moreover, the current
is likely to treat more seriously well-armed
economic difficulties are already dampening
neighbors than U.S. promises, especially if
ultimate balancer
arms sales, suggesting that an irresponsible
America's interests seem slight and its will to
in East Asia.
arms race might be difficult for Asian states
act uncertain. An assortment of capable East
to mount in response to U.S. disengage-
Asian powers would also reduce the likeli-
ment.87
hood of the United States being ensnared in
dangerous crises--especially those that might
Potentially more threatening are such dis-
lead to a confrontation with a nuclear-armed
putes as those over the Paracel and Spratly
adversary.
islands, which conceivably could lead to a
military clash. But those simmering feuds
illustrate the importance of devolving full
Toward a Sensible
responsibility, not just partial burdens, to
Security Strategy
friendly East Asian states that have far more
at stake. At some point the threat to use
force, rather than simply maintain a force
The world remains a dangerous place,
presence, might allow America to impose a
advocates of a perpetual Pax Americana ritu-
solution to a particular problem. However,
alistically intone, and so it is. But it is not
that is unlikely to be worth the cost and risk
inherently dangerous to the United States.
to the United States. Even in the rare instance
Nor are the dangers to other nations in East
in which it might be worth it, the critical
Asia as great as they were during the Cold
strike forces would be air and naval, not the
War era. As DOD acknowledges, relations
ground units presently stationed in Japan
between Russia and China are much better,
and Korea.
greatly reducing the possibility of conflict
between those two states; several other sets of
bilateral relations (RussiaSouth Korea,
America as Ultimate
China-Japan, Russia-Japan, ROK-Japan) have
Balancer
also improved.90 This doesn't mean that a
major war in East Asia is impossible, but it is
much less likely.
The United States should act as the ulti-
Defense Secretary Cohen has argued that
mate balancer in East Asia. Should a poten-
"the central lesson of this century" is "that
tial hegemon arise that cannot be contained
15