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What was once a

ernment nor the Clinton administration

buildup. Of course, even during the Cold War

believes the eventual disappearance of the

many  of  Japan's  neighbors  viewed

means, a troop

threat from Pyongyang should affect U.S.

Washington's presence as an occupation

commitment in

deployments. The ROK's defense white

force intended more to contain Tokyo than

the ROK, has

papers occasionally note with alarm Japanese

Moscow. That attitude has, unfortunately,

military outlays, while Korean academics,

not entirely abated, but there is no justifica-

now become an

policy analysts, and government officials pri-

tion for making America's East Asia policy

end in itself.

vately advocate a continuing American troop

hostage to the exaggerated fears of Japan's

presence to deter aggression by Tokyo.66 That

neighbors. The Japanese do not possess a

would have the ironic effect of transforming

double dose of original sin; their nation

an alliance originally intended to protect

along with the rest of the world has changed

South Korea from a totalitarian communist

dramatically over the last half century. The

enemy into an alliance to protect South

Japanese people have neither the desire to

Korea from another democratic, capitalist

start another conflict nor the incentive to do

U.S. friend.

so, having come to economically dominate

Washington, more concerned than Seoul

East Asia through peaceful means.

about Japanese sensitivities, is not quite so

The "New" U.S.-Japanese Defense

crass. Instead, DOD prefers the all-purpose

Guidelines

threat of instability to justify perpetuating

the Korea commitment. DOD warns of

Tokyo certainly has the potential to con-

"heavy concentrations of military force,

tribute more substantially to the region's

including nuclear arsenals, unresolved terri-

defense. The administration extols the

torial disputes and historical tensions, and

September 1997 defense guidelines as

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-

"enhancing the alliance's capability to

tion and the means of delivery serving as

respond to crises."68 However, Tokyo's new

sources of instability" in the region.67 But

responsibilities look significant only in light

of its extraordinary passivity of the past.

what U.S. forces stationed on the Korean

The principal change in the defense guide-

peninsula could do about such problems is

lines authorizes Japanese logistical support

not self-evident. A single Army division

for U.S. military operations in "areas sur-

would be of little use in fighting major

rounding Japan"--a phrase that is never

regional powers, attempting to disarm a new

defined--that are relevant to Japan's own

nuclear-weapons state, resolving regional dis-

security. Previously, Japanese officials argued

putes, or eliminating the internal causes of

that Article 9 of Japan's constitution preclud-

most instability. It appears that what was

ed such involvement unless Japan itself was

once a means, a troop commitment in the

under attack. Despite the official enthusiasm

ROK, has now become an end in itself. That

on both sides of the Pacific, the reforms fall

perverse policy should be repudiated.

far short of establishing an equal security

partnership between Japan and the United

The U.S. Commitment to

States. As Ted Galen Carpenter notes,

Japan: Time for a

Setting Sun

In the event of an East Asian conflict

that does not involve an attack on

Japanese territory, Japan will merely

Washington should follow a similar strat-

provide nonlethal logistical support

egy of disengagement from Japan, which no

for U.S. troops and allow U.S. forces

longer faces a serious security threat.

to use facilities in Japan for their oper-

Whatever dangers remain or might arise in

ations. There is no suggestion that

the future, from, say, an aggressive China,

Japanese Self-Defense Forces will par-

could be met by a modest Japanese military

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