<<  <  >  >>

Washington should prepare a phased

with significantly less alarm than does the

withdrawal program, during which Seoul

United States.60 ROK president Kim Dae-Jung

could engage in an arms buildup or arms

has proposed a "package deal": improved com-

reduction negotiations with the North, or

mercial and political relations with the DPOK

both. Upon completion of the troop with-

in return for an end to North Korean missile

drawal, the so-called mutual defense treaty

and nuclear development.

between the United States and the ROK

One may call such concessions bribes (or

would terminate. At the very least, the United

even appeasement) if one wishes, but it will

States should pull out forces that do little to

be money well spent if it maintains the peace

augment the ROK's military capabilities but

as the Korean endgame winds down. It is

act as a tripwire for automatic American

impossible to predict what course the North

involvement. The 1998 security strategy

Korean regime will take--peaceful transition,

report actually lauds that role: "Our treaty

violent implosion, or something in between.

commitment and the presence of U.S. troops

But Pyongyang's exact future is less impor-

in South Korea help deter any North Korean

tant for all concerned than is avoiding war.

aggression by making it unmistakably clear

The South will ultimately prevail, one way or

that the U.S. would immediately be fully

another, and the goal of reunification, large-

engaged in any such conflict."58 Immediate

ly on Seoul's terms, is no longer a fanciful

notion. Attempting to accelerate the

engagement, however, prevents any consid-

inevitable is not worth an increased risk of

ered reflection about the best course to take

conflict.

to defend America's interests. Even if

Although we should remain cautious

Washington wants to preserve the bilateral

about any promises by Pyongyang, the well-

defense treaty, policymakers should at least

named "Hermit Kingdom" is more open

protect this nation's freedom of action by

today than at any time in its 50-year history.61

eliminating the troop deployment.

Given North Korea's long period of econom-

Cautiously Manage the North Korean

ic and political isolation--and the regime's

Nuclear Issue

equally long history of recalcitrance--U.S.

The potential for a DPRK nuclear bomb is

threats offer little prospect of success.

unnerving, but, despite disquieting events

Moreover, a strategy of attempted coercion

such as its failed satellite launch, Pyongyang

risks plunging the peninsula into a new cold,

has so far apparently lived up to the 1994

or possibly hot, war.62 Engagement may not

Framework Agreement on freezing its nuclear

work either, but it offers far greater prospects

A strategy of

program. Washington should fulfill its own

of success.63

obligations under that agreement; the United

There are no good options if Pyongyang

attempted coer-

States has been late in providing fuel oil

ultimately attempts to develop an atomic

cion risks plung-

(because of congressional opposition) and has

bomb (as well as more advanced missiles),

failed to eliminate economic restrictions, as

although one important step would be to

ing the peninsula

promised.59 Washington should lift trade sanc-

offer to sell theater missile defense technolo-

into a new cold,

gy to friendly East Asian powers.64 A contin-

tions against North Korea and normalize

or possibly

diplomatic relations--modest concessions

ued American conventional presence would

that would offer the North ongoing benefits

serve no purpose, however. U.S. ground

hot, war.

for maintaining a peaceful course--and

forces in South Korea (and those in Japan as

encourage Japan to do likewise. At the same

well) would become nuclear hostages,

time, the United States needs to work with

enhancing the North's leverage over

China, Japan, and Russia to encourage contin-

Washington.65

ued DPRK compliance and resolve other

Reject the Phony Justifications for the

questions, such as that of the construction of

U.S. Presence

a new and suspicious underground site.

Curiously, Seoul regards that construction

Of course, neither the South Korean gov-

10