tutions. It would be useful for Washington to
equate or nonexistent training, replacement
encourage nations to resolve boundary and
parts, equipment, and food and fuel for its mili-
territorial conflicts through negotiations, per-
tary; an inefficient transportation network; and
haps through such multilateral regional orga-
a lack of allies.51 Moreover, there is nothing
nizations.
unique to the southern section of the peninsu-
The basic goal for America should be to
la--say, a special gravitational field--that pre-
step into the background as local actors take
vents the ROK from building a larger, more
on prime responsibility for their own security
robust military than the North could ever hope
and the stability of their region. Washington
to sustain.
ought to make that process as smooth as pos-
However, Seoul's response to its tempo-
sible, but America's ultimate goal should be to
rary financial travails has been to reduce mili-
endorse a new security architecture that
tary expenditures--a curious action for a
reflects the region's new reality--the absence of
country facing a dangerous and unpre-
an overwhelming hegemonic threat combined
dictable neighbor. South Korea's irresponsi-
with the opportunity for allied states to con-
ble decision doesn't seem to bother the
struct a local balance of power sufficient to
Pentagon, however. Observes DOD, "Despite
constrain any potential aggressor.
a substantial reduction of the ROK's defense
Despite a
budget, the ROK has assured the United
seemingly endless
States that it will maintain combined opera-
Withdraw from Korea
tional readiness and deterrent capabilities."52
succession of
Although South Korea is suffering eco-
promises to
nomic problems, they now seem to be eas-
The starting point for a new Asian strate-
achieve military
ing.53 In any case, the South's economic
gy is disengagement from the Korean penin-
sula, the international flashpoint that has
strength still dwarfs that of the North. Even
parity with the
the greatest potential to involve the United
with its economic troubles, the ROK possess-
DPRK, South
States in a serious war. The Democratic
es twice the population of, around 29 times
Korea never quite
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) obviously
the GDP of, and a vast technological lead
remains unpredictable and potentially dan-
over North Korea.54 If the danger is as acute as
seems to do so.
gerous, and the Pentagon rightly warns that
claimed by the Pentagon, Seoul should be
"North Korea has not relinquished its goal of
spending more, not less, on defense. Even in
establishing political primacy on the penin-
the midst of a recession, the ROK is well able
sula. Pyongyang continues to maintain a
to spend whatever is necessary to make up for
large, forward-deployed military with robust
the withdrawal of 37,000 American troops.55
capabilities." Moreover, argues DOD,
The North could then choose to engage in
"Although the substantial deterioration in
meaningful arms control negotiations or lose
North Korea's economic conditions has
an inter-Korean arms race.
inevitably affected its military forces, North
But the ROK will not make such an effort
Korea is still capable of inflicting terrible
as long as it can rely on the United States.
destruction on South Korea."49 Other people
Despite a seemingly endless succession of
promises to achieve military parity with the
embrace and even expand the administra-
DPRK, South Korea never quite seems to do
tion's arguments. Three Heritage Foun-
so.56 In the event of war, Seoul is now planning
dation analysts argue that "the North's for-
ward deployed forces require the continued
on an American deployment of 640,000 sol-
presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in South
diers, almost as many as the South has in uni-
Korea."50 Presumably, even a modest reduc-
form in all of its services.57 If South Korea
tion in that number is unacceptable.
made anything close to Pyongyang's commit-
ment to the military, the North could no
End South Korea's Free Riding
longer pose a credible threat to the ROK's
The North faces grievous weaknesses--inad-
security.
9