Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
The real lesson of
ing active forces would need to be held at the
ment officials usually talk about the uncer-
high states of readiness that were required
tain threat of the future. There is an obvious,
both Task Force
during the Cold War. This new force struc-
rather simple answer to those responses:
Smith and the
ture would be more than adequate to satisfy
"Read a newspaper." This is not 1914 or
Hollow Force is
the readiness requirements for regional war
1939, and there is no "Kaiser Bill" or Hitler
or crisis response in the current relatively
out there. When Winston Churchill was issu-
that a tiered
benign international environment. Even
ing warnings in the 1930s, he was not talking
readiness system
assuming the worst possible case of a resur-
about "uncertainties." Rather he was point-
can work for the
gent, militant Russia and a fully armed China
ing to Japan in Manchuria and China; Italy in
by 2015, the lesson of the Hollow Force
Ethiopia and Libya; and, worst of all, Hitler
U.S. military.
shows that it only took two to three years for
marching into the Saar region, Austria, and
the U.S. military to become fully ready again.
Czechoslovakia.
Thus, if by 2010 it looks like China is becom-
It is also necessary to knock down some of
ing a potential enemy (not just a peer com-
the myths of readiness. Those who cite Task
petitor), sufficient warning time would be
Force Smith and the Hollow Force have a
available to rebuild the active Army back to
"glass half empty, half full" problem. Most
10 active divisions, or perhaps even the 18
who have written about Task Force Smith get
divisions of the Cold War. The real lesson of
bogged down in the details and see a readi-
both Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force
ness glass half empty. What is really amazing
is that a tiered readiness system can work for
is to look more broadly and see how fast the
the U.S. military in a more benign post­Cold
U.S. military recovered (a glass half full).
War environment.
Again, the real lesson of the Hollow Force is
not found in all the problems that led to that
condition--and there were certainly many--
Notes
but in how fast they were solved. Further-
more, many of the problems were solved
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Dictionary of Military
without spending a lot of money. Moreover,
and Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1, January
to compare today's active-duty force with the
1986, p. 221.
shadow force of 1950 or the Hollow Force of
2. John McCain, "Ready Tomorrow: Defending
the late 1970s is simply nonsense. Another
American Interests in the 21st Century," March
mistake is to overlook today's reserve force.
1996.
Reserve forces today are much more capable
3. Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of
than they were in the past.
the People (New York: Free Press, 1998).
There is a final irony to the current readi-
ness debate. Critics cite the Korean War (and
4. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts,
Task Force Smith's role in it) and worry
Choices, Consequences (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1995).
about being capable of fighting another
Desert Storm--the two regional wars that the
5. S. Craig Moore et al., Measuring Military
United States won. Yet they never mention
Readiness and Sustainability (Santa Monica: RAND,
1991), p. 1.
Vietnam--the one war the United States did
not win. The reason, of course, is that readi-
6. Review of Readiness Considerations in the
ness had absolutely nothing to do with the
Development of the Defense Budget: Hearings before the
debacle in Vietnam.
House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Panel of
the Procurement and Military Nuclear System
Thus, examining the current threats and
Subcommittee, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington:
the myths of readiness demonstrates that
Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 36.
both the active Army and Air Force units, and
7. Walter Kross, Military Reform: The High Tech
perhaps even some Navy forces, could be cut
Debate in Tactical Air Forces (Washington: National
and more responsibilities placed in the
Defense University Press, 1985), p. 57.
reserves. Furthermore, not all of the remain-
20