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with the readiness of American forces to

perienced personnel and lack of spare parts

respond.

and munitions ("empty bins"). In fact, there

In sum, any military that can stabilize the

are at least ten different factors that con-

situation within a month after a sneak

tributed to the Hollow Force of the 1970s.

attack, conduct a complex amphibious land-

Before we get to them, a brief explanation is

ing in two and a half months, conquer the

needed of what might be called the semioffi-

enemy's homeland in four months, and then

cial definition of the Hollow Force.

respond to massive attack from the largest

The Hollow Force

army in the world is not a totally unready

military. In Desert Storm, it took the U.S.

In 1980 the term "Hollow Force" was

military--still at high states of readiness from

coined by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward

the Cold War--six months to build up in

"Shy" Meyer when testifying before Congress

almost ideal conditions before it dared to

on the condition of the Army. In that testi-

respond to the Iraqi military. In Korea, under

mony he actually talked about the lack of

the worst conditions, it took the supposedly

qualified personnel and the imbalance that

unready U.S. military only four months to

existed between the number of Army divi-

defeat the well-trained NKPA. Had the

sions and the number of personnel available

Much of the

Chinese not intervened, the Korean War

to fill those divisions.26 In 1979 he told

evidence of a

would be remembered not as the "forgotten

President Carter that only four of ten active

war" but as another Spanish-American "nice

divisions in the United States were capable of

Hollow Force is

little war." Compared with its performance in

deploying overseas in an emergency.27

anecdotal.

most other American wars--from the

However, the term was soon widely used

Revolutionary War to World War II--the U.S.

to characterize not just a lack of experienced

military did remarkably well even though it

personnel but a shortage of training and wea-

was a shallow force in 1950. Thus, readiness

pons--especially equipment, spare parts, and

of forces--measured by traditional indica-

munitions. The most vivid example came

tors--may be overrated as a predictor of suc-

from the Navy: the captain of the oiler USS

cess in combat.

Canisteo refused to get under way because his

ship was short of experienced crew. It was the

first active-duty ship in recent times that

The Hollow Force

refused to get under way because the captain

Reconsidered

thought it unsafe. More remarkable, instead

of being punished, the captain found himself

The so-called Hollow Force of the 1970s is

praised. There were also stories of ships hav-

interesting for three reasons. First, it is the

ing to "cross-deck" equipment--that is, trans-

example most often cited in today's military

fer munitions and spare parts from returning

debates. While "No More Task Force Smiths"

ships to those deploying.

is cited by the Army, almost everyone else

talks about the Hollow Force. Barely a week

A Closer Look

goes by without some politician or military

A closer look at the Hollow Force shows

analyst warning about returning to a hollow

that it involved much more than just poor

force. Second, the causal factors behind the

readiness. As the Congressional Budget

peacetime Hollow Force are more germane to

Office concluded, "Much of the evidence is

today's peaceful conditions than are the com-

anecdotal."28 A few books exist on the Hollow

bat conditions faced by Task Force Smith.

Third, and perhaps more important, "hollow

Force, such as James Kitfield's Prodigal Soldier,

force" means different things to different

but the definitive story has yet to be written.

people--which is understandable considering

"Hollow Force" is one of those terms that

the admittedly subjective nature of readiness

everyone uses but few have really defined.

itself. Semiofficially, the term refers to inex-

Nevertheless, from the scant literature avail-

9