Compared with
manders are usually lieutenant colonels in
Inchon amphibious landing that outflanked
their mid-30s and regimental commanders
the NKPA. By all measures, amphibious land-
its performance
colonels in their early 40s, in Korea many
ings are considered one of the most complex
in most other
were well into their 40s and even 50s. (This
military operations and can only be conduct-
American wars,
was not, incidentally, the problem with Task
ed by ready, well-trained troops.
Force Smith because Smith was only 34.)
NKPA Routed. Then, after Inchon, it took
the U.S. military
Unfortunately, this also seems to be an
another month to push the NKPA back to
did remarkably
American tradition. In the early years of
the 38th parallel. By early November some
well even though
World War II, Gen. George Marshall had to
American forces had reached the Yalu River.
cull the Army officer corps--often firing old
Thus, in a little over four months, the war
it was a shadow
friends who were simply too old. The Navy
was--or should have been--over. It was the
force in 1950.
had to relieve some older, less aggressive ship
intervention of the Chinese that changed the
commanders early in that War.
situation.
Inadequate Air Cover. Finally, Blair cites the
Chinese Intervention Checked. Even with the
lack of air support in the early days of the
massive Chinese intervention, the U.S.-led
Korean conflict. He criticizes the Air Force
forces generally responded well. Unlike the
for its penchant for first clearing the skies
earlier routs during the initial NKPA attacks,
and bombing enemy air fields instead of con-
these withdrawals were usually orderly. In
ducting close air support of ground forces
short, the U.S. military had learned well.
and attacking the NKPA tanks.25 This prob-
There were still some mistakes. For example,
even when it was obvious that the Chinese
lem was later rectified. Interestingly, once
had intervened, Maj. Gen. Edward M.
again, it was the Marines who showed the
Almond, commander of the X Corps, sent yet
way. When the first Marine unit arrived, it
another task force--Task Force MacLean--
had tanks and close air support.
forward to attack. The task force was deci-
A Broader Look
mated when withdrawing, but it was not
routed. A British force was similarly decimat-
In addition to failing to look at all the fac-
ed, but much of the blame lies with the "stiff
tors that went into the demise of Task Force
upper lip" attitude of the commander--who
Smith, critics of the task force make an even
failed to notify his superiors of his true
worse mistake. They fail to take a step back
plight.
and take a broader look. Such an examina-
Korea Was Always a Sideshow. The Korean
tion provides evidence that the experience of
War was always considered peripheral--with
Task Force Smith supports rather than
the real communist offensive expected to
undermines the case for tiered readiness.
come in Europe. There were also fears that
The Situation Stabilized in Only a Month. Task
the Soviet Union might attack Japan. If that
Force Smith was routed on July 5th, but only
happened, there were contingency plans to
a month later--on August 4th--the Pusan
abandon Korea and return the Eighth Army
perimeter was established. Although a few
to defend Japan. Even during the war, the
more weeks of intense fighting ensued, by
best equipment often went to Europe or
about the middle of August the outcome was
remained in the United States. For example,
really no longer in doubt. The NKPA was
although the F-86 Sabre jets were the only
spent. Stabilizing the military situation in
planes that could take on the MiGs, major
only a month after a sneak attack by a ready,
debates erupted about sending them to
well-equipped enemy is remarkable. But that
Korea.
was only the beginning.
Stalemate a Political Decision. Finally, most
Inchon. What critics forget to mention is
people remember the Korean War as a three-
that on September 15th--only two and a half
year "stalemate," but that was a political, not
months after the rout of Task Force Smith--
a military, decision and had nothing to do
U.S. forces were able to conduct the famous
8