<<  <  >  >>

War II, the Army lost its first major engage-

today--and then panicked.

ment at the Kasserine Pass. But it is not real-

Initially Bad Command. Although Task

ly surprising that the aggressor nation invari-

Force Smith is usually singled out as the

ably wins the early battles. Besides having the

major disaster, other battalions also per-

element of surprise, the attacker has the

formed poorly in the first weeks of the

option of choice and is usually better pre-

Korean War. The next unit to face the NKPA

pared. In short, the defeat of Task Force

was the 34th Infantry Battalion, the perfor-

Smith followed a long military (and

mance of which was "considerably more

American) tradition of losing the early battles

inglorious than that of Task Force Smith."22

of wars.21

It was not until the Pusan defense perimeter

was established in early August 1950 that

Bad Position. Task Force Smith was first

American battalions stopped being routed.

outgunned by NKPA armor and outnum-

Blair criticizes the American leadership for

bered by NKPA infantry. Even worse, the task

sacrificing battalions piecemeal instead of

force was in a bad position alone out in front

establishing a good defense perimeter.23

of other friendly forces. In the same situation,

the eventual results would have been the

U.S. Forces Not Prepared for Tank Battles.

same, whether the group was a green Task

During the early weeks of the war, the NKPA

Force Smith or an elite group like the 82nd

had tanks and the allies did not. The reason

Airborne or the Rangers. In fact, in 1990 the

was that Korea was not considered "tank

82nd Airborne was in a similar situation

country." That was one reason why the South

when it was initially deployed in Desert

Korean Army was not given tanks and why

Shield. Fortunately, the Iraqi armored units

U.S. tanks were not sent earlier. The U.N.

did not attack. If they had, the military had

forces had no armor until the Marines

contingency plans to evacuate the 82nd

arrived with their Patton tanks. Not provid-

Airborne by sea, just as British troops were

ing some of the thousands of Sherman tanks

from Dunkirk, France. And, 43 years later, a

left over from World War II to the ROK Army

group of Rangers found themselves in a sim-

was questionable. Modernized medium

ilar situation in Somalia; unfortunately 18

Sherman tanks were finally sent to Korea and

died. Yet no one is writing about "No More

performed well.

82nd Airborne" or "No More Rangers."

The above are the seven major reasons for

Readiness. There is no question that a bet-

the failure of Task Force Smith and other

ter trained unit with better weapons--such as

battalions in the initial weeks of the Korean

3.5-inch rocket launchers instead of obsolete

War. There are also three other minor rea-

2.36-inch bazookas--would have performed

sons:

In Korea, under

better. But performance probably would have

Commanders' Lack of Combat Experience.

the worst condi-

improved only on the margins. By today's

The commanders had little--or limited--

tions, it took the

standards, Task Force Smith probably would

combat experience even though it was only

have been rated C-3 at best and maybe even

five years since World War II. Many had spent

supposedly

C-4--that is, not combat ready due to lack of

their time in staff jobs in that war. Even those

unready U.S.

proper training and equipment. Considering

with experience had fought in the more open

military only four

that rating, Task Force Smith performed

terrain of Europe. That lack of experience

remarkably well. Much is sometimes made of

showed; several battalion and regimental

months to defeat

the obsolete 2.36-inch anti-tank bazookas,

leaders were fired in the first months of the

the well-trained

but Task Force Smith actually withstood the

war.

initial armor assault. The real problem, as

Commanders Too Old. Many U.S. comman-

North Korean

noted, occurred during the withdrawal. Even

ders in the Korean War were simply too old.

army.

here the problem was that one platoon was

Blair places great emphasis on the fact that

not fully informed of the retreat--a classic

many of the Army commanders were too old

communications problem that is still found

for field commands.24 While battalion com-

7