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budgets could afford to maintain. It was not

finest hour, there were many factors leading

just a hollow force but, in the opinion of

to its so-called rout. Readiness per se was real-

many, a mere shadow of a force.

ly only one--and not even the most impor-

American forces in the theater were not

tant. There were ten factors, seven major and

much better. The Eighth Army in Japan had

three minor, that explain the defeat of Task

four divisions at less than full strength.

Force Smith and other U.S. battalions at the

Furthermore, from 1945 to early 1949, that

beginning of the Korean War. Readiness

force was strictly an occupation force that

would rank as about the fifth of the major

conducted virtually no training. By mid-1949

factors.

both the American forces in Japan and the

A Superior NKPA. The NKPA had a larger,

ROK Army were starting to undergo training

well-trained, and well-equipped army. Critics

to increase their readiness, but in June 1950

of Task Force Smith usually fail to mention

the training was barely under way.

that the NKPA was a very capable, well-

Underestimation of the Enemy. The United

equipped force of some 135,000 men. It con-

States underestimated the enemy, one of the

sisted of over ten divisions: seven were con-

most basic of all military mistakes. Even

sidered combat ready and three were newly

those who should have known better made

activated. Also, about one-third of the force

Poor readiness

that mistake. Clay Blair, the author of The

was veterans of the Chinese civil war. In addi-

was only one of

Forgotten War: America in Korea, states that

tion, there was an armored brigade equipped

MacArthur "was guilty of grossly underesti-

with Russian T-34 tanks. All told, the NKPA

the many factors

mating the capabilities of the enemy."17 Maj.

had 150 tanks, which would prove crucial in

leading to the

the early days. The North Korean Air Force

Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the

rout of Task

had 200 Yak-9 fighters and Il-10 ground-

24th Army Division that first deployed to

attack bombers. When the Russians departed

Korea, thought the engagement would be

Force Smith.

North Korea in 1948, they left behind a well-

"short and easy."18 As Task Force Smith

trained army, which they continued to sup-

moved to the front, its members had an

port.

"overconfidence that bordered on arro-

By contrast, when the Americans departed

gance," according to one observer.19

the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, they

Two days after the rout of Task Force

left behind a 50,000-man paramilitary con-

Smith, Dean wrote to MacArthur, "I am con-

stabulary armed with only light weapons. By

vinced that the North Korean Army, the

1950 South Korean president Syngman Rhee

North Korean soldier and his status of train-

had built a 95,000-man army, but it had no

ing and the quality of his equipment have

armor and only a few smaller artillery pieces.

been underestimated."20 Unfortunately, the

Despite repeated requests by Rhee, the

generals would make the same mistakes for

United States refused to supply South Korea

several more weeks. Perhaps the worst state-

with tanks, heavy artillery, or planes. There

ment of underestimation was President

were fears that Rhee might attack North

Truman's off-hand remark to a reporter

Korea--which he had threatened to do--and

(which he would come to regret) that this was

Washington did not want to give him the

a "police action."

means of doing so.

First Engagement Syndrome. There is an old

In general, American forces were not

military saying that "every unit breaks on ini-

much better off. The U.S. Army had ten divi-

tial contact." Unfortunately, that seems to be

sions manned at less than full strength; the

an old American trait. In both the Revol-

Air Force had 48 air groups that were under-

utionary War and the War of 1812, the

strength; and the Navy had about 250 ships--

United States lost most of the early engage-

only about half of which were at full strength

ments. It took the Union Army over a year to

and ready. The force was larger than

win a major battle. In World War I, it took

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's defense

over a year to get the Army ready. In World

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