<<  <  >  >>

Opponents of any

and the Hollow Force of the mid to late

under his command--to respond. Among the

1970s.

first groups to arrive in Korea on July 1st were

decrease in readi-

two companies (totaling 406 men) com-

ness cite two

manded by Lt. Col. Charles "Brad" Smith.

Task Force Smith

major

Those companies were only lightly armed

Reconsidered

with--besides their rifles and machine guns--

examples--Task

The Task Force Smith incident is impor-

four 75-mm recoilless rifles, four 4.2-inch

Force Smith in

tant for two reasons. First, it is cited--usually

mortars, four 60-mm mortars, and ten 2.36

the Korean War

by the Army--as one of the two major exam-

bazooka rocket launchers (which were con-

ples of the consequences of not being ready.

sidered obsolete and ineffective against

and the Hollow

Retired Army Colonel and syndicated mili-

tanks). In addition, a small battery of six 105-

Force of the

tary columnist Harry Summers has written

mm artillery (with 124 men) was assigned,

over a dozen commentaries on Task Force

but it had only six rounds of anti-tank

1970s.

Smith since the end of the Cold war.16 "No

ammunition. That small force of 540

Americans was gloriously labeled "Task Force

More Task Force Smiths" has become a

Smith." The local commander, Maj. Gen.

mantra for the Army. But Task Force Smith is

William F. Dean, sent them forward with

actually more important for another reason.

orders to simply show themselves. There was

The Task Force Smith response to the North

a feeling that the mere appearance of

Korean attack on South Korea is, in fact, the

American troops would stop the North

only strategic example in the history of the

Korean Peoples Army (NKPA).

United States where readiness--the ability of

Smith deployed his forces forward on July

forces to deploy quickly and perform initially

4th. But the 406 troops, backed up by a small

in wartime--was truly needed. There are

artillery battery, could only cover a limited

other examples of strategic sneak attacks--

front. The next day, Task Force Smith was

such as the one on Pearl Harbor--but no

confronted by an NKPA armored regiment

immediate  counterstrike  was  needed.

led by 33 T-34 tanks. Despite the lack of ade-

Because of the strategic invulnerability of the

quate anti-tank weapons, Task Force Smith

United States (resulting from the vast buffer

withstood the initial tank assault and

of the Pacific Ocean), the nation had the lux-

destroyed four tanks. During that armored

ury of taking time to build up forces while

assault, most of Smith's troops performed

conducting a slow island-hopping war

well. Although many of the inexperienced

against the Japanese. During wartime, there

artillerymen ran, the artillery officers and

are many tactical examples of surprise

noncommissioned officers stood their

attack--the most famous being the Battle of

ground. Task Force Smith was then attacked

the Bulge in World War II. But Korea is the

by the NKPA infantry and fought well for

only really bolt-out-of-the-blue strategic

almost seven hours. Finally outflanked and

attack that required an immediate tactical

afraid of being overrun, Smith ordered a

response. Therefore, a full analysis of all the

withdrawal. Here is where the trouble really

factors behind the rout of Task Force Smith

began. The troops were ordered to pull out

is important. However, before the analysis, a

with one company covering another, but one

brief description of what happened to Task

of the platoons failed to get the word. That

Force Smith is helpful.

platoon found itself isolated and the men

Background

simply "bugged out" with many leaving their

weapons behind.

North Korea invaded South Korea on

June 25, 1950. Almost immediately, on June

A Closer Look

27th, President Truman decided to intervene

While there is no question that the Task

and ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur--then

Force Smith episode was not the U.S. Army's

stationed in Japan with four Army divisions

5