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fairly simple, actual measurements of readi-

not combat ready because it is undergo-

ness are more complex and have many sub-

ing substantial maintenance.11

jective and intangible elements. There appear

to be some fairly solid, objective indicators of

Overall readiness is reported at a level consis-

readiness--such as the number of qualified

tent with the lowest rated resource level. That

personnel in a unit or a plane or ship being

is, a division with only one battalion below

"down." But even those indicators often get

par can get a lower rating. On the other hand,

complex or subjective. For example, a unit

commanders are allowed to subjectively

might show the requisite number of quali-

upgrade or downgrade the overall ratings.

fied personnel, but their effectiveness might

Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary

be undermined if they were on drugs or

of defense for manpower, breaks readiness

morale was poor (as was the case for the

down into two major parts, each with two ele-

Hollow Force). Another example of ambigui-

ments:

ty is whether a ship with only one of several

· material

radar systems down is ready or not.

readiness consisting of (1)

The Pentagon uses a procedure called the

material inventories and (2) material

Status of Resources and Training System to

conditions and

· personnel readiness consisting of (1)

measure readiness. Units report their overall

readiness status, as well as the status of four

personnel inventories and (2) training.12

resource areas: personnel, equipment and

supplies on hand, equipment condition, and

However, there are also some more intan-

training. The readiness status of a unit is

gible, yet important, measures that are even

then reported by assigning "C" levels:

harder to evaluate and quantify--for exam-

ple, some of the terrible morale problems of

· C-1:

the Hollow Force, such as rampant drug use.

The unit can undertake the full

The Marines have tried to capture that com-

wartime mission for which it is orga-

plexity by illustrating readiness as a series of

nized or designed; that is, it is fully com-

overlapping circles that represent training,

bat ready.

· C-2: The unit can undertake the bulk of

people, individual units, morale, confidence,

public support, operations tempo, equip-

its wartime mission; that is, it is sub-

ment, age of equipment, and unit sustain-

stantially combat ready with only

ment (for example, ammunition).13

minor deficiencies.

· C-3: The unit can undertake major por-

In short, although some objective mea-

Measurements of

tions of its wartime mission; that is, it is

sures exist, important subjective qualifiers

marginally combat ready (it has major

are needed. As former secretary of defense Les

readiness are

deficiencies) but can still perform its

Aspin has commented, "The first problem in

complex and have

assigned missions.

addressing the issue of readiness is that there

· C-4: The unit requires additional

is no simple way to define what readiness

many subjective

is."14 The General Accounting Office has con-

resources or training to undertake its

and intangible

wartime mission. But if the situation

cluded, "[Status of Resources and Training

elements.

dictates, it may be required to under-

System] does not capture all the factors that

take portions of the mission with exist-

DOD considers critical to a comprehensive

ing resources. In short, the unit is not

readiness analysis, such as operating tempo

combat ready because it has so many

and personnel morale."15

deficiencies; it cannot perform its func-

Thus, given all the problems of measuring

tions.

readiness--including a certain element of

· C-5: The unit, for example, a ship in

subjectivity--it is important to analyze more

concrete examples and case studies. The two

overhaul, is not prepared to undertake

cases most often cited are Task Force Smith

its wartime mission; that is, the unit is

4