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No. 342

April 29, 1999

IS READINESS OVERRATED?

Implications for a Tiered Readiness

Force Structure

by James L. George

Executive Summary

unit fairly easily routed by the North Koreans at

Readiness, the capability to respond quickly to

the start of the Korean War, and the Hollow Force

a conflict with the appropriate force, is considered

of the 1970s when, for example, ships could not

one of the most important elements in defense

get under way for lack of experienced crew and

planning. From one-third to well over one-half of

spare parts.

the defense budget goes toward maintaining readi-

A closer look shows that readiness was only one

ness. Few people questioned the need for readi-

of many factors behind the rout of Task Force

ness, especially after the attack by North Korea

Smith and the Hollow Force. Moreover, a broader

against South Korea in 1950 and during the Cold

examination shows those examples to be as much

War, when the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was poised

cases "for" as "against" tiered readiness. With no

to quickly thrust into Western Europe without

major threats on the horizon until at least 2015,

much warning.

only those forces needed for crisis response or an

However, with the Cold War over, the notion of

initial response to a Major Theater War are needed.

"tiered readiness"--with some units less ready than

Other forces could be placed in the reserves, elimi-

others and the increased use of reserve forces--has

nated, or placed in an inactive "mothball" status.

been suggested. Opponents cite two major exam-

This means that more emphasis should be placed

ples in arguing against any decreases in readiness:

on maintaining the readiness of the reserve force.

Task Force Smith, which was a green U.S. Army

________________________________________________________________________________

James L. George, currently a freelance writer, is a former congressional professional staff member for nation-

al security affairs.