Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Today hydrogen
base, general consumer goodwill, and
cles would begin to be marketed in 2010 at a
rapidly improving technologies. The opti-
$10,000 premium per vehicle over conven-
costs more than
mal hydrogen choice (direct hydrogen fuel-
tional vehicles.1 7 7 Given that the vehicle today
$9 per gallon of
cell vehicles) is simply not achievable with-
could cost $200,000, aggressive assumptions
gasoline equiva-
are being made here as well.1 7 8
out staggering transition costs; it would
require an entirely new refueling infrastruc-
Any analysis forecasting a transition to
lent because of its
ture, entailing an investment of tens of bil-
hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles must be consid-
limited scale of
lions of dollars in the United States alone.
ered with utmost caution. One researcher
Hybrid fuel-cell vehicles (fueled by a liq-
from Argonne National Laboratory explained:
production.
uid) could use the existing service-station
infrastructure if they used gasoline,
The idea that anyone can successful-
methanol, or diesel for onboard conversion
ly project what fuel cell costs are
to hydrogen. But such vehicles would
going to be in 6­12 years . . . seems a
require complicated engine designs with
ludicrous proposition. . . . Com er-
m
lower fuel-cell performance, have greater
cialization means virtually every-
weight and need more space, and have over-
thing about current cells must
all higher vehicle cost. In either case, a
change drastically. Furthermore, not
chicken-and-egg problem exists between
only the fuel cell must change--we've
producing enough hydrogen vehicles to
got to drive down the costs of all
lower cost and having costs low enough to
parts of the electric drive train, that
encourage mass consumption and produc-
is, motor, power electronics, etc.--or
tion. In the case of direct hydrogen designs,
consign fuel cells to a niche market.
today's hydrogen (produced primarily from
Nevertheless, someone willing to
natural gas) costs more than $9 per gallon
string together a prodigious number
of gasoline equivalent because of its limited
of "what if" calculations can come
scale of production.1 7 4
up with a semi-rationale approach to
taking a stab at a number.1 7 9
This predicament points toward one
necessity--massive government involve-
ment over and above a large private effort.
Hope, hedging, and public relations--in
The authors of the Department of Energy
addition to a dose of venture capitalism--
study state, "Government incentives such
spring eternal. Exxon, ARCO, Shell, Chrysler,
as the California zero emission vehicle
and other companies are studying hydrogen
(ZEV) mandate will probably be necessary
and fuel-cell technology as a potential source
to stimulate initial [fuel-cell vehicle] mar-
of energy for transportation in the next cen-
tury.1 8 0 General Motors and Ford have
kets, in addition to government-supported
research, development and demonstration
announced production of a hydrogen fuel-
projects."1 7 5 Even under an aggressive sce-
cell vehicle by 2004.1 8 1 The most aggressive
nario of government subsidies ($400 mil-
initiative belongs to Daimler Benz (Chrysler's
lion by 2008 in this case) and mandates and
new European parent) that has announced a
private-sector investment, 1 to 2 million
goal of having 100,000 fuel-cell vehicles on
vehicles at most would be operating at the
the road by 2005 and has entered into a $325
close of the Kyoto Protocol budget period
million program with Ballard Power Systems
(2012), according to this study. Only in the
to that end.1 8 2
2020-30 period would 10 to 30 million
"The hydrogen economy," summarized
vehicles be hydrogen powered, still leaving
The Economist, "will be a consequence not of
fossil fuels with a 95 percent market share
the running out of oil, but of the develop-
of the domestic auto fleet.1 7 6
ment of the fuel cell--just as the oil economy
was not a consequence of coal running out,
A study by five environmental groups in
but of the fact that the internal-combustion
1997 concluded that hydrogen fuel-cell vehi-
29