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can provide the requisite capability to protect

noted earlier, an accidental or unauthorized

against the threat from rogue states. Instead,

launch from China is even more unlikely--in

the debate should be about the nature and

part, because Chinese warheads and propel-

capabilities of a limited NMD system that will

lant are stored separately from the missiles.

accomplish the mission of protecting the

But the threat from rogue states does rep-

nation against threats from rogue states, and

resent a real danger that could justify a limit-

do it cost-effectively. Only then can an

ed NMD deployment. That deployment does

informed decision be made about NMD.

not have to be extensive or expensive. The

threat from rogue states is likely to be rela-

Notes

tively modest (a few ICBMs) and unsophisti-

cated (their missiles are unlikely to have mul-

tiple warheads or sophisticated countermea-

The authors wish to acknowledge and thank

sures), requiring an equally modest response.

Michael Sirak and Inside Washington Publishers

A limited ground-based NMD system of

for providing access to their internal database of

100­300 interceptors should provide suffi-

articles published in Inside Missile Defense. The

cient defensive capability against threats from

authors also wish to thank the staff of the

rogue states. (A sea-based NMD system is a

Ballistic Missile Defense Technical Information

The elements in

poor substitute for a land-based NMD for

Center for providing access to their library of

the Clinton

technical and operational reasons and takes

research materials.

away scarce resources needed to field such a

administration's

ground-based system.) A limited ground-

1. Quoted in Center for Security Policy,

NMD program

based system would have some inherent, lim-

"Congressional Leadership Vows to Defend

can provide the

ited capability against a Russian accidental or

America Against Missile Attack: Will It Be Able to

unauthorized launch but would not be

Do So in Time?" Decision Brief no. 96-D30,

requisite capabili-

designed to counter that scenario.

March 22, 1996, p. 3.

ty to protect

Deploying a limited ground-based NMD

system would not upset nuclear deterrence or

2. Quoted in Carla Anne Robbins, "High-Stakes

against the threat

stability between the United States and

Debate on Missile Defense Is Here Again," Wall

from rogue states.

Russia. Even if the NMD system went beyond

Street Journal, August 7, 1998, p. A12.

the bounds of the ABM treaty (as is likely), it

would not pose a direct threat to Russia. If the

3. Ibid.

NMD system were designed to protect against

relatively small attacks (for example, 20 war-

4. Ibid.

heads), it would hardly represent a defensive

capability sufficient to allow the United

5. "If Missile Defense Systems Were Horses,"

States to launch a nuclear first strike against

Atlanta Constitution, May 23, 1996, p. 22A.

Russia with the expectation that it could suc-

cessfully defend against a Russian retaliatory

6. "Defense America Act Impractical," Oregon

strike.

Statesman-Journal, June 4, 1996.

Therefore, the debate should not be about

whether or not to build missile defenses. A

7. The so-called "deficit hawks" are a notable

limited ground-based NMD should be built

exception. House Budget Chairman John Kasich

when the technology is ready. The elements in

(R-Ohio), for example, is generally conservative

the Clinton administration's NMD program

on many issues but voted against rapid deploy-

20