unauthorized launch from Russia is a possi-
were done by different organizations at differ-
bility, it does not present a sufficient threat to
ent times (presumably with somewhat differ-
warrant building an expensive layered defen-
ent methodologies and assumptions).
sive system. The chances of an accidental
However, it does provide some idea of the vast
launch from Russia have been reduced by a
differences among NMD options. No assess-
recent agreement by the United States and
ment of the options can be made if the NMD
Russia to share early-warning data on missile
debate continues to be driven by overheated
launches. In addition, planning to build a lay-
political rhetoric. But the number of viable
ered NMD system that could destroy larger
options can be reduced significantly by defin-
numbers of warheads might destroy the
ing the proper mission for an NMD system.
attempt to renegotiate the ABM treaty with
Clearly, we do not need to build an NMD
the Russians and imperil nuclear stability
system to defend against a Russian preemp-
between the United States and Russia. As
tive first strike. And although an accidental or
__________________________________________________________________________________
Table 3
Comparison of NMD Options
__________________________________________________________________________________
Comments
NMD Option
20 ground-based interceptors
Latest DoD cost estimate: $13 billion in acquisi-
tion costs. Larger deployment required (at least
100 interceptors) for protection against even
small attacks.
100 ground-based interceptors
CBO cost estimate: $14 billion in acquisition
costs. Provides protection against small attacks
(up to 20 warheads). Prior DoD estimate was
$10 billion.
300 ground-based interceptors
CBO estimate: $18 billion in acquisition costs (3
sites). Protection against larger attacks (more
than 20 warheads) or increased effectiveness
against small attacks.
100 ground-based interceptors
CBO estimate: $31 billion in acquisition costs
plus 500 space-based interceptors
($71 billion when operational and support costs
are included). Protection against more sophisti-
cated attacks (up to 60 warheads), including
countermeasures.
300 ground-based interceptors
CBO estimate: $60 billion in acquisition costs
plus 500 space-based interceptors
($140 billion when operational and support costs
and 20 space-based lasers
are included). Protection against large attacks
(up to 200 warheads), including sophisticated
countermeasures.
Sea-based NMD
Acquisition costs are uncertain, but probably at
least $20 billion. Sea-based TMD is not NMD-
capable--that is, SPY-1B radar and LEAP seek-
er on interceptor are not NMD-capable. Relying
solely on space-based sensors to guide inter-
ceptor is questionable. Probably cannot provide
complete coverage of the United States (that
is, targets in the middle of the United States
are vulnerable).
19